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This study investigates the question: How has European integration impacted regionalist 
political parties’ electoral support? European integration and regionalism are theoretically 
connected by Seth Jolly’s viability theory which explains that supranational organizations, such 
as the European Union (and precursor organizations), make small countries more viable. Using 
the regions of Flanders, Corsica, Sardinia, Padania, Galicia, and Catalonia as case studies, this 
thesis identifies moments of European integration and then examines if regionalist electoral 
results match the expectations of viability theory. This thesis found support for the idea that 
European integration is positively affecting regionalist political parties in elections; however, 
there often exists other contextual factors that can modify or negate this effect. European 
integration is just one of the many issues that regionalists must address, but, as this thesis shows, 
it is an issue that deserves their attention and, if used wisely, their support. I conclude the thesis 
by considering the implications of the viability theory for different decision-makers within the 
European Union and its member countries, and I explore how regionalism needs a solution from 
supranational organizations because, as more countries join and spend longer in supranational 
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As a quick aside, here is a bit I wrote about why I wrote this thesis: 
 As a child, I liked two things, though I did not like only these two things: world maps 
and world flags. When these are things you like, you spend quite a bit of time learning and 
memorizing them. Eventually, you get to the point where you can name every country on the 
map and identify each flag (granted you may still confuse Guinea and Mali). At this point, you 
want more. You can entertain yourself with country capital but those are less visually fun. Going 
down to the province level of every country of the world seems overwhelming and, if we are 
being honest, most province-level flags are pretty mediocre. Eventually, you realize the issue is 
that there are not enough countries in the world, and this informs you forming the belief that 
there ought to be more countries in the world. As you grow older, first this starts to guide your 
political beliefs and you desire devolution of power as, if more countries are better and we 
assume that all countries have a territorial component, and we assume that there is a finite 
amount of land then more countries necessarily mean smaller countries and therefore, if smaller 
countries are better, then so is more localized government. Your love of maps and flags enters its 
final evolution when you start to consider what allows there to be more countries. Trying to 
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Introduction 
 To start, I think it is useful to explain my motivation behind this project. The question 
that started this research was what allows there to be more countries in the world. I was inspired 
to ask this question because it seems that, generally, since the World Wars, we have seen the 
creation and existence of more countries and fewer large empires. Reflecting on this question, 
my initial thoughts considered that globalization and higher levels of technology lower the 
likelihood of existential war and facilitate the ease of trade and communication. I also considered 
world accountability schemes or supranational organizations dedicated to preventing violent 
conflict and lowering trade barriers. With these elements in place, a group of people with a 
shared identity might feel more secure existing outside their previous larger country. If this is 
true, then that would allow for a more small-countried world.1 Exploring the academic literature 
on this, I found that there did indeed exist similar theories that talked of balancing the advantages 
and disadvantages of different state (country) sizes, and one theory in particular that built on this, 
to test if supranational integration, specifically within the world’s most powerful supranational 
organization the European Union, was making small counties more viable.  
Viability Theory  
Seth Jolly builds the arguments of viability theory by starting with the existing academic 
literature on the optimal size of a state.2 The current consensus on this is that there are tradeoffs 
in favor of a smaller state vis-à-vis a larger one. Smaller states are considered typically to be 
composed of a more culturally homogeneous population, which typically leads to higher societal 
trust, a lower likelihood of rebellion, and a government that is more efficient at providing public 
 
1 There exist other elements, of course, that could push back against this, such as hegemonic or bi-polar world order 
where those in power mandate the continuation of borders drawn by European diplomats the century before in the 
name of “stability.”  
2 Of this I consider, Alesina and Spolaore’s Size of Nations to be the defining work.  
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goods for its citizens because its citizens’ lives are more similar.3 Additionally, regardless of 
homogeneity, smaller governmental jurisdictions are considered to be more accountable and 
more efficient at identifying policy solutions and evaluating policy outcomes.  
However, there are four serious advantages for large states.4 First, nonrival public goods 
(i.e. public television and radio, knowledge shared by television or radio, or street lighting) are 
less expensive per person as the number of people paying for each public good increases. 
Second, absent of a global free-trade-only world order, larger states have larger domestic 
markets and thus offer barrier-free access to a larger market for individual domestic economic 
actors. This larger domestic market, and the ability to allow or restrict access to it, provides 
greater leverage in international trade deals as well. Third, regional economic shocks are easier 
for a large state to handle, because they draw from a larger area and economy to redistribute 
from. Fourth, larger states have more resources (human, natural, and economic) to draw on when 
fielding an army, and thus tend to be better at guaranteeing their citizens’ security.5 Now, by 
understanding the balancing act that is determining optimal state size, I can explain viability 
theory.  
 Viability theory is a theory that states that globalization and regional integration6 are 
providing, to a degree, the same advantages of a large state without altering the advantages of a 
small state, thereby, rebalancing the appeal of a small state. This provides political parties that 
promote territorial autonomy for a cultural identity, which I will call regionalists, with a stronger 
and more appealing argument for the viability of their proposed state. If this theory is true, we 
 
3 Seth K Jolly, The European Union and the Rise of Regionalist Parties (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2018), 40.  
4 The four following advantages come from Alesina and Spolaore by way of Jolly, European Union, 41.  
5 A good way to think about this is the benefits of the Holy Roman Empire for its smaller members.  
6 I believe technological advancement (besides just facilitating regional integration) is also an important part of this 
equation, but that is outside the scope of this paper. As I stated earlier, I believe this to be because higher levels of 
technology may lower the likelihood of existential war and definitely facilitate the ease of trade and communication.  
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should expect to see regionalist political parties do better in elections after European integration 
provides the large state advantages. Viability theory does not estimate the time it will take for 
these better election results to appear, but the increase should, outside of being caught in other 
political cycles, be relatively imminent and enduring.  
Therefore, to clearly spell out the purpose of this research, I will first look for moments 
when European integration provides larger-state advantages to a smaller state, which I will label 
as triggering the mechanisms of viability theory. This will mostly occur through the ratification 
of new treaties that provide a public good (public goods benefit), lower intrabloc trade barriers or 
provide for greater leverage in negotiating international trade deals (market benefit), establish the 
provision of structural funds to help with negative economic shocks (structural funds benefit), or 
further guarantee collective security (security benefit). Each of these exactly correlates to one of 
the four advantages of a large state as explained above. Most treaties will do more than one of 
these things, but rarely all. At all such moments, I try to be explicit about which of these four 
viability mechanisms are being triggered.  
I then comb through the electoral results of regionalist political parties in the aftermath of 
these moments and see if they make the expected gains. Finally, if the viability theory is true, 
then regionalist political parties should be pro-European integration or, at the very least, envision 
their proposed state within a European integration framework that preserves the provided large 
state advantage for themselves. To give an example of this distinction, a regionalist political 
party may disagree with how the European Union is handling certain issues such as immigration 
and refugees and still be benefiting from viability theory; however, if the regionalists’ proposed 
state would exist outside the European Union’s free trade zone, this position makes no sense 
within viability theory and thus any electoral gain coming from a position like this would present 
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a challenge to viability theory or be non-applicable. For this reason, I consider generally 
regionalist political party attitudes and messaging about European integration as well. And, now 
armed with a compelling explanatory theory and three key things to look for (moments of 
integration, electoral results, and attitudes towards integration), I seek to answer my research 
question: how has European integration impacted regionalist political parties’ electoral support?  
Preview of Findings  
To support his proposal of viability theory, Seth Jolly did present evidence. He 
quantitatively examined all the data (in the form of electoral results and political attitude 
surveys) and found that European integration had a statistically significant positive effect on the 
emergence and support of regionalist political parties.7 He also found that regionalist parties are 
generally pro-European integration.8 Along with his statistical modeling, Jolly did a single in-
depth case study of Scotland. He found Scottish regionalism to be consistent with his 
quantitative findings and in support of viability theory.9 While the Scottish case study is a good 
start, I will approach my analysis through a more thorough qualitative lens. Therefore, I selected 
six case studies. In a brief preview of what I have found from these case studies is that they 
generally match with the expectations of viability theory, which is as expected given Jolly’s 
statistics, but, in context, there is often a lot more happening than a clean viability theory-
induced increase of regionalist parties’ success. Many times, regionalists explicitly use viability 
theory-based arguments, but sometimes they capitalize on anti-EU sentiment. Many times, the 
results increase as expected, but other times there are periods of limited success (which is 
sometimes explainable and other times not). Furthermore, fragmentation has hindered many 
 
7 Jolly, European Union, 151. 
8 Ibid., 152. 
9 Ibid., 152-153. 
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regionalist parties and movements, but, also despite fragmentation, the total regionalist vote 
share can continue to rise. All in all, I consider viability theory to be usable for understanding 
and explaining regionalist success, and, if used as a rule of thumb, viability theory will guide you 
well. However, since there are more considerations than just viability theory, for individual cases 
viability theory may be an oversimplification. 
Case Studies and Their Selection  
As for how I selected the case studies, I first had to start by figuring out the number of 
separate regionalist cases I could choose from. I found 21 different regions within countries 
engaged in European integration that had had a regionalist political party that at some point 
campaigned for more than just greater federalism. The reason for the greater-than-federalism 
qualifier is that there are countries like Belgium where parties with non-regionalist goals operate 
under a regionalist name by virtue of the electoral system and other places like Spain which, in 
response to certain bona fide regionalist demands, gave all its regions regional powers and thus 
created regionalists that just want to remain a part of Spain because they are from an area with no 
distinct regionalism. However, within the regions I did select, there are still periods when the 
main regionalist party desires only federalism. It is also important to note that there were 
significantly more than 21 regionalist political parties that I found (even with the greater-than-
federalism qualifier) because often many were representing the same region (such as both Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego and Coalicion Galega represented Galician regionalism). 
 I then narrowed down the pool of possible regions by excluding regions from countries 
that had joined the European Union (EU) post-2004 enlargement. This is because there has only 
been one major treaty on EU integration since 2004, the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, so that would 
present both a limited number of moments of integration to examine as well as a smaller time 
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frame of electoral results. However, and this is somewhat promising for viability theory, the 
post-2004 group represented only a small amount of the 21 regions, and I needed to narrow it 
down further.  
At this point, I decided to focus my examination on the electoral results of national 
elections, as opposed to regional or European-level elections.10 The reason for this is that 
European elections are relatively new and few, compared to the complete timeline of European 
integration, plus it is unlikely that a regionalist party would partake in a European election and 
not a national one, so European elections would just be casting a smaller exploratory net. As for 
why I selected national elections over regional elections, well, I reasoned that, if a regionalist 
movement’s aim was from greater autonomy up to independence, to do this democratically 
would require the complicity of the national-level government. Therefore, there is much more to 
be gained for the strongest (in center-periphery terms) regionalists by contesting national-level 
elections thus self-selecting for me those most likely to be using viability theory’s arguments. 
Therefore, to ensure that searching the electoral records was not in vain, I chose only regions that 
had successfully elected at least one representative from a regionalist party to the national 
government.11 This left me with 11 options. Jolly had already done Scotland, Bavaria had been 
but was no longer serious about the greater-than-federalism qualifier, Friesland had completely 
stopped competing in national elections and was mostly focused on the provincial level, the 
Basque County is known for violent means, which disqualifies the case from a study of 
democratic means of secession, and finally, the Faroe Islands had a decolonization factor (in part 
 
10 As you will see, I will from time to time in the case studies consider regional and European results as well, but the 
guiding focus is on national-level results.   
11 I acknowledge that these selection criteria might overlook cases of regionalist failure. However, my tasking is to 
determine European integration’s impact on regionalist political parties, so it is best to examine the places where it 
most likely had an impact, as opposed to trying to figure out if or why in other regions it likely did not.   
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because of Greenland) that made it feel similar to the Curacao, Aruba, and Sint Maarten set up 
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, albeit within the Kingdom of Denmark, and I sought to 
avoid conflating decolonization and regionalism. With those eliminated, I had my six case 
studies.  
Road Map for Thesis  
This Introduction has introduced viability theory and explained both my process for 
analyzing viability theory’s veracity and my process of selecting the case studies. The following 
body chapter calls itself Chapter 1. All body chapters will go region by region, case study by 
case study, following a chronological review of the moments of European integration, regionalist 
party electoral results, and regionalist political party stances (especially with regards to pro-/anti- 
Europe and desired future outcomes such as more autonomy vs. complete independence). All 
region reviews end with a brief look to the future. The first half of Chapter 1 is on the Flanders 
region of Belgium, starting from the post-WWII era and continuing until the present day. This 
section is especially focused on the role devolution of power can play in placating regionalist 
demands. The second half of Chapter 1 is about the island of Corsica, currently within the nation 
of France. This is the section that is most tied to political violence, so this is where I briefly 
discuss the intersection between viability theory and regionalist-led violence. In Chapter 2, Italy 
is the country of focus, with the first half on the island of Sardinia, and the second half on the 
newest region of this study: Padania. Sardinia is an important section on the setbacks regionalists 
can face, including poor decision-making and unfair political systems. These setbacks provide a 
valuable test and moment of reflection for viability theory. Padania is one of the most successful 
regionalist movements of this study and is the first stop if you are interested in creating your own 
regionalist movement in the modern era or if you want to learn about how a regionalist 
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movement can be co-opted for other purposes. Finally, in Chapter 3 (the third and final body 
paragraph), the case studies are set in Spain. The first half of the chapter is focused on the 
Galicia region. This is a case of a regionalist movement that has benefited from sharing a country 
with more powerful and more organized movements. Finally, the last case study is Catalonia. 
Catalonia is a region where the regionalists dominate the electoral scene, so I use it as an 
opportunity to dive into the nuance of viability theory by focusing on the regionalists that desire 
complete independence (within the EU) and how they fare after moments of integration against 
more moderate regionalists. The last chapter is the Conclusion. Here I review in-depth what I 
have learned from my qualitative approach and grasp at the fumes of wisdom to offer advice to 




Flanders and Corsica  
In this chapter, I will examine the Flanders and Corsican regionalist movements under the 
lens of the viability theory. First, I will describe the Flanders region’s territory and history, then I 
will give an overview of the political climate in Flanders prior to European integration. Next, for 
several EU treaties or integration moments, I will explain how EU integration triggered the 
mechanisms that support the viability theory and the subsequent electoral results and trends. I 
will do this for the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome, 
the Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty of Lisbon. I will also provide historical background and 
ideological overviews where appropriate. I end briefly looking towards the future. I will then 
repeat this process with Corsica. I will be paying attention to external factors that constrain the 
Corsican regionalist movement such as population and economy size. Additionally, I will 
consider internal factors as well, such as the use of violence and the fragmentation of parties. 
Again, I will provide historical background and ideological overviews where appropriate, and I 
will end by offering some thoughts on the Corsican nationalists’ future.   
Flanders  
 The first region of this study is Flanders. Territorially, Flanders is the northern half of 
Belgium excluding the Brussels Capital Area. Because of the complexities of the Belgian 
political system though, the modern Flemish parliament is based in Brussels which is technically 
out of its jurisdiction besides cultural matters for the Flemish-speaking citizens. Another defining 
characteristic of the Flanders region is a shared language, Flemish (which is a dialect of Dutch). 
This contrasts with the French-speaking southern half of Belgium, known as Wallonia. 
Historically, Belgium came into existence in the 1830s after a revolt from the Netherlands and 
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international intervention by Britain and France. At the time of Belgium’s independence, with 
the exception of a few key cities (such as the port city of Antwerp), Flanders was a poor agrarian 
economy and as such dominated economically by Wallonia.1 Additionally, the elites of Flanders 
embraced French culture and spoke French, so, with a wealth- and tax-based suffrage system, 
there was little resistance to a French-language-dominated state, prior to industrialization.2 All 
this is important in understanding how a bilingual country came to exist in the first place and 
what the current regionalist movement uses to define itself.  
 What followed Belgian independence was a century of industrialization. This greatly 
increased the wealth of Flanders and caused Wallonia and Flanders to switch roles in terms of 
economic prosperity. Belgium then experienced a series of national crises: an invasion by the 
Germans, the Great Depression, and another invasion by the Germans. Collectively recovering 
from these moments and slowly rebuilding the country under the reversal of new regional roles 
sets the stage for the first elections of the post-WWII landscape.  
With regards to the Flanders nationalist political parties, the first was the Frontpartij 
(Front Party, 1919). The party formed out of networks created during the Great War to solve the 
communication problems created when the Flemish soldiers could not talk to nor understand 
their French-speaking commanding officers.3 The Great War had therefore highlighted the 
underlying disconnect and disparity between the two language communities. The Frontpartij 
wrangled 60, 814 votes in the 1919 House of Representatives election which was good for 3.5% 
of the vote and 5 seats. This dropped to 2.8% (54,941 total votes/4 seats) in 1921 then climbed to 
 
1 Els Witte, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen. Political History of Belgium: From 1830 Onwards. (Brussels: ASP, 
2009), 56-59.  
2 Matthias Trefs, “Belgium,” in Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook. ed. Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver. 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), 270.  There were a few writers in Flanders, such as Jan-Frans Willems, Hendrik 
Conscience, and Theodoor Van Rijswijck who continued to support the Flemish language, but their efforts were not 
aligned with the rural or laborer classes. (Witte, Craeybeckx, and Meynen, Belgium, 57.) 
3 Tref, “Belgium,” 275.  
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3.9% (80,407/6 seats) in 1925 and 5.9% (132,567/11 seats) in 1929.4 After the victory of getting 
Flemish recognized as a national language in 1932, party leader Staf De Clercq took the party to 
a far-right fascist stance and, after losing its liberal and moderate supporters, Frontpartij was 
dissolved into Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National Alliance; 1936). This party had 
encouraging initial success with 7.1% and 8.3% of the vote in 1936 and 1939, respectively.5 
However, their collaboration with the Nazis during the German Occupation of Belgium (for 
which they were rewarded as the exclusive representative of the Flemish community under 
occupation but also led to the party assisting in the identification and capture of Jewish 
Flemings) made the party and its primary politicians deeply unpopular after the German defeat. 
The Flemish National Alliance would not recover, and no Flanders regionalist party would win a 
seat in 1949 nor even compete in the 1950 general election.6 This is the state of Flanders 
regionalism prior to the European integration that happened after the Second World War.  
One of the key components recognized as playing a part in the First and Second World 
Wars was the hostilities between France and Germany and their competition for the resources of 
industrialization: coal and steel. On May 9th, 1950, French foreign minister Robert Schuman 
unveiled what would be later known as the Schuman Plan to place coal and steel under a High 
Authority, higher than any individual governmental authority, within the countries of France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Belgium.7 With there being no exclusive 
access to coal and steel for any member country, this greatly decreased the need to go to war 
again with another member country. A treaty that accomplished this was agreed in 1951, and the 
 
4 For the unmentioned 1932 election, the numbers remained constant at 5.6% or 130,755 votes, good for 8 seats. All 
election data here from: Nohlen and Stöver, Elections in Europe.  
5 In terms of total votes: 166,737 in 1936 and 185,470 in 1939 (Nohlen and Stöver, Elections in Europe.) 
6 Nohlen and Stöver, Elections in Europe. 
7 “The European Coal and Steel Community,” EU Learning, Carleton University Center for European Studies, 
accessed January 22, 2021. https://carleton.ca/ces/eulearning/history/moving-to-integration/the-european-coal-and-
steel-community/.   
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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) came into force in 1952. In addition to a High 
Authority, the institutions of the Assembly, the Council, and the Court of Justice were created. 
These are all precursor institutions for European Union institutions today. A common market, 
with free movement of products without taxes nor discriminatory measures, for coal and iron ore 
opened in February 1953 and for steel in May 1953.8  
As the viability theory explains, regionalist movements should benefit when 
supranational organizations lower barriers to trade (market benefit) and provide public goods 
(public goods benefit). The ECSC clearly lowers the barriers to trade of key industrialization 
goods, and, by developing a common policy with a common monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism, the ECSC provided public goods as well. There a few more dynamics at play at the 
time as well. In 1949, in response to a coup by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed.9 This military alliance, which included 
Belgium, provided collective security for all members (security benefit). Additionally, there was 
the Benelux Customs Union, a WWII government-in-exile deal among Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg to eliminate customs duties on trade among the three countries as 
well as impose a common external tariff. This took effect in 1948 and evolved into the Benelux 
union treaty of 1949 which eased quantitative restrictions (quotas, levies, etc.). Both of these 
treaties further lowered barriers to trade (market benefit) and further rebalanced the advantages 
of a large state versus a small state, in favor of the small state. All of these agreements were in 
place and in effect by the Belgian elections of 1954 and 1958.  
 
8 “Text: Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty,” Summaries of EU Legislation, 
EUR-Lex, last modified December 11, 2017, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Axy0022.   
9 History.com Editors, “NATO.” History.com. A&E Television Networks, April 14, 2010, last modified June 7, 
2019, https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/formation-of-nato-and-warsaw-pact.   
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While not without any historical legacy, Flanders as a post-WWII regionalist movement 
had to restart from ignominy and a period without an organized political party or any votes 
received. This presents a unique opportunity to investigate the viability theory for it is unlikely 
any new regionalist emergence or success can be attributed to a trend prior to integration. Enter 
the Volksunie (People’s Union, 1954). Formed by seven Flemish nationalists, none of whom had 
been tainted by Nazi collaboration, Volksunie was primarily allied with Flemish farmers and the 
Flemish middle-class.10 Their platform, which was the solution proposed by a study group (that 
included the seven Volksunie founders and some Walloon counterparts) on European integration 
and its potential dangers for small language and cultural communities, was to federalize Belgium 
into two parts, based on language.11 The Volksunie also demanded far greater rights for the 
Flemish language.12 While not against European integration, just concerned by its potential 
effects, the origins of the Volksunie show that European integration restarted the Flemish 
regionalist conversation. With the difficult task of recovering in public opinion from the 
association of the Nazi collaboration of former Flemish regionalist parties and without a far-right 
stance (which makes it unlikely the party was recovering the far-right voters from before the 
war), in the House of Representatives election of 1954, Volksunie received 113,632 votes or 
2.2%, good for a seat in the national legislature. This impressive feat (and the important seat) 
was replicated in 1958 with 2% of the total vote. Volksunie’s emergence as a Flemish regional 
political force clearly coincided with the start of supranational integration of the country.  
 
10 Lieven De Winter, “The Volksunie,” in From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Challenges of 
Representation, ed. by Elias Anwen and Filippo Tronconi (Wien: Braumüller, 2011), 30. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Kris Deschouwer, “The Rise and Fall of the Belgian Regionalist Parties,” Regional and Federal Studies 19, nos. 
4-5, (October – December 2009): 563, https://doi.org/10.1080/13597560903310279.  
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When Belgium joined the European Economic Communities (EEC) through the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, Belgium entered into a common market for goods, people, services, and capital 
(market benefit) with the same countries in the ECSC (the EEC went into effect in 1958).13 This 
further integration coincided with Volksunie getting close to doubling its number of votes in the 
next three consecutive elections: up to 3.5% (182,407) in 1961, 6.7% (346,869) in 1965, and 
9.8% (506,697) in 1968.14 Flanders regionalism was no longer even on the fringes but a 
mainstream political party. Additionally, political parties that sought to represent Wallonia’s 
interests emerged as a response to the Flemish regionalists popularizing an agenda that focused 
on securing benefits for one’s own region. This Wallonia counter-regionalism focused on the 
sentiments of marginalization caused by the civil service requiring its employees to speak both 
Flemish and French which disqualified a large amount of people from Wallonia and French-
speaking Brussels since only people from Flanders were typically bilingual.15 These Walloon 
and French-speaking Brusselian political parties aided the Volksunie in their regionalism goals of 
decentralization and federalism, as the party’s leading politicians would enter positions of power 
within the government in the form of cabinet ministers as a reward for helping form coalition 
governments with the larger non-regionalist parties. These regionalist parties tended to be easy 
allies for bigger ideology parties as they were willing to compromise on other policy areas in 
exchange for a devolution of powers agenda. As the Volksunie and the other pro-federalism 
parties took part in sharing power in the 1970s, they slowly created national political support for 
regionalism. This created the phenomena of the non-regionalist large ideological parties dividing 
 
13 “Text: Treaty of Rome (EEC),” Summaries of EU Legislation, EUR-Lex, last modified March 14, 2017, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0023. 
14 Nohlen and Stöver, Elections in Europe.; There was a further increase to 11.1% (586,917) in 1971, before a 
leveling off at around 10% for the following two decades. (Nohlen and Stöver, Elections in Europe.) 
15 Tref, “Belgium,” 278. 
Piel 15 
 
themselves into two parties, a French one and a Flemish one.16 This strategy undercut the 
electoral success of the strictly regionalist Volksunie but furthered their goals, as most major 
parties were now framed as belonging to one region (or community) or the other. Though the 
Volksunie was out of power, Belgian governments instituted a series of state reforms developing 
the unique devolution of power system used today by creating, evolving, and refining 
communities (Flemish, French, German-speaking) and regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) 
until the fourth state reform in 1993 declared Belgium a fully-fledged federal state.17  
This period (1971-1993) is a complicated moment of analysis for the viability theory 
because, while greater EU integration started up again under the 1987 Single European Act 
(public goods benefit and security benefit), electoral support for the Flanders independence 
political parties was remaining relatively stagnant.18 One explanation for this stagnation is that 
often concessions (i.e. language protections, power over cultural matters given to the 
communities, etc.) and decentralization can serve as an antidote or a soothing balm for 
separatism movements. Another explanation is the fracturing of the Volksunie between those 
who accepted the federalism antidote and those who did not, with the independence hardliners 
forming a new political party called Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block, 1979). Ultimately, Volksunie 
was surpassed by Vlaams Blok and dissolved into a rebranding as the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
(New Flemish Alliance, 2001). However, as political scientist Matthias Tref sums up after 
considering Belgian electoral politics as a whole, “[a]t the turn of the millennium, the VU 
 
16 Tref, “Belgium,” 278-279. 
17 “The Third and Fourth State Reforms,” Belgium.be, accessed January 24, 2021, 
https://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/history/belgium_from_1830/formation_federal_state/third_and_
fourth_reform_of_state.  
18 And in fact, possibly decreasing. Volksunie vote share was decreasing but Vlaams Blok vote share was increasing 
to maintain a level amount of support for regionalist parties (Nohlen and Stöver, Elections in Europe). However, it is 
unclear if Vlaams Blok was receiving support because of its regionalist stance or because of its right-wing populist 
stance. (Deschouwer “Rise and Fall,” 572-574)   
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[Volksunie] finally ceased to exist with virtually all of its goals achieved.”19 By this, Tref means 
that because of the federal system, while still Belgian citizens, the daily life of a Flanders 
resident is mainly governed by the Flemish government. Volksunie’s dissolution set up the 
current Flemish regionalist political party landscape in Belgium.    
It is important to note that there was a flurry of integration throughout the 1990s that 
started with the creation of the European Union (EU) and its three pillars. Through the 1993 
Maastricht Treaty, the EU sought to continue the ECSC and the EEC (pillar one, continuing the 
market benefit), form a common foreign and security policy (pillar two, public goods benefit and 
security benefit), and cooperate on justice and home affairs (pillar three, public goods benefit).20 
Pillar two further guaranteed the security of Belgium and the people within, while both pillar two 
and three can be seen as providing public goods for the EU citizenry as a whole, taking away the 
Belgian state’s individual responsibility for developing a foreign policy, border controls and 
laws, or asylum policy. The creation of the Euro as a common currency (market benefit) was also 
planned and, after a series of steps, put into place by 1999 and put into people’s wallets by 2002. 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 further integrated the EU block with common visa and sanction 
policies. These are further public goods provided by the EU (public goods benefit).   
Throughout all of this integration, the support of regionalist movements did not correlate 
in a manner similar to their success and the creation of the ECSC or the EEC. This challenges the 
viability theory. One way to view this challenge is that it is unknown how long or how effective 
the decentralization process (in general or the specific Belgian process) is as an antidote to 
regionalism. It is possible that the communities and regions system had still placated voters and 
 
19 Tref, “Belgium,” 279.   
20 “Text: Treaty of Maastricht on European Union,” Summaries of EU Legislation, EUR-Lex, last modified March 
21, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0026.  
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preoccupied the political parties through the 1990s. Additionally, further reforms occurred with 
more powers being transferred to the regional authorities through the fifth Belgian state reform in 
2001.21 Thus, by 2009, scholars were declaring Belgian regionalist political parties “a victim of 
their own success” and, within this framing, writing of the decline and death (at least in terms of 
political relevance) of the Flemish regionalism movement, with Vlaams Blok’s perseverance 
being explained through its appeal as a far-right and populist movement that just also happen to 
want an independent Flanders.22 Though that was a logical way to construct a narrative on 
Flemish independence at the time, from the past decade, I think it is safe to say these claims were 
premature, as I will show after introducing the Treaty of Lisbon and examining the modern 
Flemish regionalist political parties. 
The most recent incident of further EU integration occurred in 2009 through the Treaty of 
Lisbon. This treaty created the European Parliament which strengthened the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Union and the European Central Bank which strengthened the 
economic uniformity within the EU. The treaty also approved a new stronger trade policy that 
allowed the EU to conclude international agreements on foreign direct investment.23 The Treaty 
of Lisbon also established a foreign service system and formally enumerated a mutual defense 
guarantee that was already largely implied but finally formalized.24 This round of integration 
provided the EU with better leverage in trade situations (market benefit), which again rebalances 
the trade-offs between large and small states within the EU in favor of the small state. 
Additionally, there was the Euro crisis that deeply impacted the finances of the EU but showed 
 
21 “The Fifth State Reforms,” Belgium.be, accessed January 24, 2021, 
https://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/history/belgium_from_1830/formation_federal_state/fifth_refor
m_of_state. 
22 Deschouwer, “Rise and Fall,” 560, 566, 574.  
23 “Text: Treaty of Lisbon,” Summaries of EU Legislation, EUR-Lex, last modified December 15, 2017, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/LSU/?uri=celex:12007L/TXT.   
24 Ibid.  
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that the European Union would provide funds to regions undergoing cyclical economic 
hardships. Structural funds to help with economic shocks (structural funds benefit) are another 
key benefit of large states that, when provided through integration, increase the perceived 
viability of small states. There are two tales to tell starting in 2010, one of Vlaams Blok and one 
of Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, as Flanders regionalism proved it was far from over.  
The name Vlaams Blok no longer exists. The party was forced into a name change in 
2004 after several affiliate organizations were found guilty of racism.25 However, the party 
cleverly persisted by renaming themselves as Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, 2004) which 
allowed the party to keep the familiar abbreviation of VB. The ideology of Vlaams Belang on 
Europe and European integration is nuanced but unusual. As I explain in the Introduction, Jolly’s 
research found that regionalist movements are typically pro-European Union. Vlaams Belang is 
often described as Eurosceptic which is hard to argue against considering the greater European 
Parliament party of which Vlaams Belang is a part lists, “the party [Vlaams Belang] is very 
reluctant and critical of the European Union with its bureaucracy and interference in areas where 
people's sovereignty should prevail” for its stance on Europe.26 However, the party’s definition 
of itself is pro-European and still in favor of the EU, though against any greater integration that 
would create an EU superstate.27 Additionally, Vlaams Belang seeks to take back immigration 
controls, a reaction to the waves of immigration caused by the European migrant crisis, and to 
end the Euro thereby stopping the subsidizing of Southern European countries, a reaction to the 
Euro crisis.28 An ideal Flanders for them would be friendly with its neighbors, maintaining 
 
25 Tref, “Belgium,” 281. 
26 “Vlaams Belang – Flanders,” Identity and Democracy Group – English, accessed January 26, 2021, 
https://www.idgroup.eu/vlaams_belang. 
27 “Programma: Een Vrij Europa,” Vlaams Belang, last modified December 10, 2020, 
https://www.vlaamsbelang.org/programma/.  
28 Ibid.  
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cooperation and integration (likely through the EU), aside from border controls and economic 
and monetary policies that support economies other than their own. Interestingly this ideal 
scenario would likely undo some of the integration, specifically the provision of structural funds 
to help with cyclical economic shocks (structural funds benefit), that theoretically makes 
Flanders more viable as an independent state.  
What this amounts to is a delicate balancing act in which Vlaams Belang still desires EU 
integration with the party favoring the economic benefits and security the EU provides, yet 
coming into conflict with the EU only when the party feels like it is losing out economically or 
when the identity and territory it claims to represent is under threat. To Vlaams Belang, 
European integration helps Flanders as long as it stays within bounds. These bounds support 
three out of the four mechanisms of viability theory, with the only objection to the provision of 
structural funds to help with cyclical economic shocks and certain, but not all and not even most, 
public goods. For this reason, Vlaams Belang’s ideology on European integration is mostly in 
line with the ideology expected by viability theory. The Vlaams Belang also desires Brussels as 
the capital of Flanders, which, with its large French-speaking population and its capital of the EU 
status, seems difficult to achieve.  
Vlaams Belang received 7.8% (506,697) of the 2010 Chamber of Representatives vote.29  
This represents a decrease from the average of 11% the VB parties received throughout the prior 
decade.30 This decrease does not challenge the viability theory because what likely happened is 
the voters that Vlaams Belang lost were due to Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s large electoral gains 
 
29 “Elections: Belgium Parl Jun 2010,” IFES Election Guide, https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/473/.; A 
further state reform by 2010 had changed the Senate into a body comprised of the regional parliaments, effectively 
making the Chamber of Representatives the only nationwide election.  
30 “Elections: Belgium Parl Jun 10 2007,” IFES Election Guide, https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/399/.;   
“Elections: Belgium Parliamentary May 18 2003,” IFES Election Guide, 
https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/311/   
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(discussed below and shown in Table 1), therefore the regionalism movement as a whole gained 
support, just the right-wing form of it was less appealing for that election. This trend of 
decreasing support continued in 2014, with Vlaams Belang receiving only 3.6% of the vote while 
the more moderate Flanders nationalists made more gains, though not quite enough to offset 
Vlaams Belang’s losses.31 However, despite the slight decrease, Flanders regionalists as a whole 
were able to start consistently bringing in a quarter of all votes, which is higher than in any 
previous period. In 2019, the cycle of politics swung back to the right and Vlaams Belang 
captured 12% (810,177) of the vote, making them the second biggest party in the Belgian 
Parliament, only behind the other Flanders regionalists, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie.32 Despite this 
success, Vlaams Belang has stayed part of the opposition instead of joining a coalition 
government.33 A key point here is that there are greater trends at play with a rise in the right-
wing and far-right populist parties in the second half of the 2010s which still affected Flanders 
regionalist voters, but overall the regionalism movement continued to gain support, especially 
through Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie.  
One of the big differences between the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and the Volksunie is that 
the Volksunie, while facing a much different governmental landscape, was willing to 
compromise on complete independence in exchange for federalism. However, Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie “believe[s] in a gradual development where increasingly more competences are 
transferred to Flanders and Europe and where the federal level gradually disappears. Our final 
 
31 “Elections: Belgium Chamber of Deputies 2014,” IFES Election Guide, 
https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2404/.   
32 “Elections: Belgium Chamber of Deputies 2019,” IFES Election Guide, 
https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3150/.; “Chamber: Results in Figures,” Elections 2019, last modified 
June 24, 2019, https://elections2019.belgium.be/en/results-figures?el=CK&id=CKR00000.  
33 This is in part because there is an agreement to not form coalition governments with Vlaams Belang.  
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target is indeed an independent Flanders as a European Member State.”34 On other issues, the 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie is seen as center or center-right, with the occasional progressive 
stance.35 Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s ideology aligns closely with what is expected of a 
regionalist movement seeking independence through increased supranational small state 
viability. This is because the party is clearly pro-Europe and explicitly buys into the logic of the 
viability theory, shown by Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s official position: 
The N-VA wants a stronger Flanders in a stronger Europe. After all, more and more 
challenges are arising in this globalized world that we must deal with at a supranational 
level. The macro level for us is the European Union. Competences that require a 
supranational approach must therefore be transferred to the European level (i.e. currency, 
defense, migration, internal market, energy, etc.). Competences that must be exercised 
closer to the people must be transferred to Flanders, which is the appropriate micro level 
for the N-VA.36 
Specific reference is made to three of the four viability mechanisms I have identified as being 
competences for the supranational level. Common migration policy and common energy 
management would be the EU providing a public good (public goods benefit). The internal 
market is a direct reference to the lowing of trade barriers (market benefit). Defense is a common 
security provision guarantee (security benefit). There is the potential for the viability theory to be 
a self-fulfilling prophecy here, as Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie is keenly aware, through specific 
platform reference, of theory from the Size of Nation by Alesina and Spolaore which provides, in 
 
34 “Frequently Asked Questions,” Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), last modified September 18, 2015. 
https://english.n-va.be/frequently-asked-questions#ideology.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
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part, both the inspiration and theoretical underpinnings of Jolly’s research on viability theory.37 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie platform says, “It is often said that Flanders would be too small in 
a Europe that is only getting bigger... These processes aren’t contradictory but complementary: 
globalisation precisely encourages localization”.38 While this speaks to the innately compelling 
logic of viability theory for regionalists, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie would need to see electoral 
gains for Flanders regionalism to support its claim.  
 Starting as a splinter group, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie had to rebuild its brand and 
popular appeal. While doing this through the 2000s and hindered by a new 5% threshold for 
Parliament Representation, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie formed a Flemish center-right cartel 
with the Flemish Christian Democrats that put the Flanders autonomy and independence 
questions on the backburner.39 Eventually, with too little progress on the regionalist front, the 
cartel was dissolved and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie took part in the 2010 Belgium elections on 
its own. These elections were a huge success, with Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie winning 27 seats 
with 17.4% (1,135,617) of the vote, making them the largest party in the country.40 However, 
after a long period of negotiation, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie were left out of the new 
government. The next elections in 2014 built on the previous success, with 20.3% (1,366,414) of 
the vote and 33 seats going to Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie.41 This time they did form part of the 
government (the “Swedish” center-right government of Michel I).42 However, this period saw 
 
37 Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), “Frequently Asked Questions.”  For more on the relationship between Size of 
Nations and viability theory, see the Introduction section of this paper.  
38 Ibid.  
39 “History,” Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), last modified December 17, 2020, https://english.n-va.be/history.   
40 IFES Election Guide, “Belgium Parl Jun 2010.”; One does have to remember that like-mind parties operate both a 
Flanders and a Wallonia branch leading to many different parties so, while still a large victory, 27 seats in a chamber 
of 150 is by no means dominating.   
41 IFES Election Guide, “Belgium Chamber of Deputies 2014.”; Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie remained the largest party 
in Belgium.  
42 Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), “History.”  
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little action taken towards their regionalist goals. This is in part because the need to build a 
coalition government required compromise with more moderate Flanders parties and like-minded 
French-speaking parties. This lack of progress on regionalism from the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
could explain some of the gains made by Vlaams Belang in the 2019 elections.43 These elections 
in 2019, caused by the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie’s withdrawal from the government after 
disagreeing with Prime Minister Michel’s handling of the UN’s Global Compact for Migration, 
saw the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie remain the largest party in the country but lose seats after only 
receiving 16% (1,086,787) of the vote.44  However, the beautifully named Vivaldi government 
was formed from four different ideology groups (the “Four Season”) which left both Flanders 
nationalist parties in the opposition.45  
Table 1: 
Data from IFES Election Guide.  
Going forward, the future looks promising for the Flanders regionalism movement. The 
December 2019 poll, if elections were to happen soon,46 had Vlaams Belang seeing significant 
gains, while Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie is projected to experience mild losses, resulting in a 4 seat 
 
43 In addition to the wave of right-wing popularity mentioned earlier.  
44 IFES Election Guide, “Belgium Chamber of Deputies 2019.”; Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), “History.  
45 Pauline Bock, “Why Did It Take so Long to Form Belgium's New 'Vivaldi' Coalition?” euronews (Lyon), October 
7, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/07/belgium-s-new-government-why-did-the-vivaldi-coalition-take-so-
long-to-form.  
46 This is unlikely given the need for stability because of the COVID-19 crisis, but possible in the short future given 
the amount of disagreement between each of the four ideological factions currently in government.  
Year  Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie  Vlaams Belang   Combined  
2010 17.4% 1,135,617  7.76% 506,697 25.16% -- 
2014 20.26% 1,366,414 3.67% 247,746 23.93% -1.23% 
2019 16.03% 1,086,787 11.95% 810,177 27.98% +4.05% 
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gain for Flanders regionalists in the national Chamber of Representatives.47 So, should the 
European Union integrate more, or should the gradual increase caused by current integration 
continue, support for regionalism within Belgium appears to follow the expectations of the 
viability theory pretty dependably and therefore regionalism will likely continue to increase. 
There is little left in the way of decentralization before Flanders and Wallonia are de facto two 
separate EU member states, and the Flanders nationalists will not hesitate to formalize any de 
facto independence. The Brussels question looms large, but in the face of significant political 
pressure, politicians might have to finally come up with an answer.            
Corsica  
 The next region that I will evaluate is Corsica. Corsica is the fourth largest island in the 
Mediterranean and currently a part of Metropolitan (European) France. By way of being an 
island, the boundaries of this regionalist movement are very clearly defined because Corsica’s 
independence would mean independence for the entire island, the few surrounding islets, and 
nothing else. Corsica has ruled itself in the past, with an internationally unacknowledged 
independence in the mid-18th century, until the Genoese, who owned the island according to the 
European elite but exerted little real influence on it, sold Corsica to the French.48 The de facto 
independent Corsica Republic was quickly defeated, and the island has been a part of France 
ever since. Culturally, after centuries of French rule and exchange, most Corsicans speak French, 
but there is a unique dialect of Italian known as Corsu that is widely used as well.49  
 
47 David Coppi, “Grand Baromètre: à La Chambre, Vlaams Belang Et N-VA Majoritaires Dans Le Groupe 
Flamand,” Le Soir (Brussels), December 14, 2019, https://plus.lesoir.be/266872/article/2019-12-14/grand-
barometre-la-chambre-vlaams-belang-et-n-va-majoritaires-dans-le-groupe.    
48 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Corsica,” accessed February 5, 2021, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Corsica.  
49 Ibid.  
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 There are two factors that stand out when contrasting Corsica with Flanders: population 
and economic prosperity. Though Corsica is a relatively large island, its population density has 
remained consistently low, relative to Metropolitan France. Starting after World War II and 
obviously fluctuating over time, the total resident population has never surpassed 350,000 which 
means that all people in Corsica have never even made up 1% of the French electorate.50  This 
means that the national-level democratic process has been and is a significantly less effective 
venue for Corsican regionalists. There is no chance at a democratic plurality like in Flanders 
unless Corsican regionalism started campaigning for support from regions outside Corsica. To do 
this, outside of diaspora votes, Corsican regionalists would have to convince voters of other 
regions that they represent those voters’ interests while explicitly and publicly representing the 
interests of a different region.51 It seems this would be an unsuccessful strategy and, likely for 
that reason, has not been a priority for Corsican regionalists. Second, Corsica is not an 
economically prosperous region. Its economy has historically relied mainly on agriculture, and, 
in modern times, agriculture has remained but been supplemented with food processing and 
tourism.52  French historian Jean-Jacques Becker points out that being a part of France offers 
substantial economic benefit to the Corsicans. On Corsica, “no other French department receives 
as many subsidies, both legally and through back channels; and no other French department has a 
higher ratio of civil servants and welfare recipients.”53 While this means that there are more 
factors working against the regionalism movement, Corsica presents an opportunity to observe if 
 
50The electorate of Corsica is even lower because of children and unregistered adult voters; “Corse – Population,” 
Eurostat, accessed February 5, 2021, 
https://circabc.europa.eu/webdav/CircaBC/ESTAT/regportraits/Information/fr83_pop.htm.   
51 And, at times, representative of a region that ultimately would leave the country.  
52 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, “Corsica.” 
53 Jean-Jacques Becker, “Corsica,” in Europe since 1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of War and Reconstruction, ed. 
John Merriman and Jay Winter (Detroit, MI: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2006), 724. 
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the viability theory’s trends persist independent of demographics and relative economic 
prosperity.   
 The modern Corsican regionalist movement starts in the 1960s.54 Several organizations 
merged to form the Regional Front of Corsica in 1966. These organizations were the Corsican 
Union (1960), the National Union of Corsican Students (1962), and the Committee for the Study 
and Defense of the Interests of Corsica (CEDIC, 1964).55 The combined party did not last very 
long as only the CEDIC wanted to run in elections (the other groups were ideologically opposed) 
and thus after only managing 2.3% of the Bastia legislature vote, the CEDIC decided to break off 
and create their own party, the Action Regionaliste Corse.56 They still had little success locally 
and no success nationally.  
 However, France has accompanied (some might say helped lead) Belgium through the 
same rounds of European integration as both are members of the original ECSC six. There is a 
point to be made here that might seem obvious but should be pointed out: viability theory is only 
in play when the region in question is able to be affected by one of the theory’s mechanisms. The 
mechanisms triggered by the ECSC’s creation in 1952 were the lowering of trade barriers on 
only coal, steel, and iron ore (market benefit) and the creation of public goods that affected these 
industries only (public goods benefit).57 Corsica does not produce or significantly import any of 
these materials, so, with no economic reliance on coal, steel, or iron ore, Corsica was largely 
unaffected by the ECSC’s creation. 
 
54 There was a brief regionalist movement in the interwar period, but it never participated in an election and was 
interwoven with Italian fascist irredentism (Luis de la Calle and Andre Fazi, “Making Nationalists Out of 
Frenchmen?: Substate Nationalism in Corsica,” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 16, no. 3/4 (2010): 399, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2010.527228.)  
55 de la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 399.  
56 Ibid. 
57 For more on the ECSC and its relation to viability theory, see the Flanders section of this Chapter.  
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The existence of NATO did trigger the supranational guarantee of security (security 
benefit) mechanism, but it appears in this context that this was not enough for a regionalism 
movement to emerge. One possible reason for this could be that Corsica’s status as an island 
makes the country feel more physically protected from external threats. Another is that the only 
nearby countries of France and Italy, both of which would highly object to Corsica falling under 
the rule of another global power, are perceived as friendly. There is the potential that security 
guarantees are a supplementary mechanism, not impactful enough by themselves. An analysis on 
how military alliances affect regionalist movements could be helpful in further exploring this 
mechanism. Rationally, since most military alliances are formed either for offensive endeavors 
or defensively in response to an active threat,58 it seems unlikely that they correlate with or 
promote internal regionalism on their own. In 1958, the Treaty of Rome creates the European 
Economic Community and ushers in the removal of trade barriers (market benefit), a common 
market for goods (market benefit), a public good in the form of a common trade policy and a 
customs union (public goods benefit), and the European Social Fund (structural funds benefit). 
These forms of integration correspond with the mechanisms of viability theory and, and as 
explained above, with the arrival of a regionalist movement in Corsica by the early 1960s.  
 Once the movement for an independent Corsica exists, it is faced with the population 
challenge described above. Not only is the Corsican electorate relatively small, but national 
legislative elections (as well as cantonal) follow the first-past-the-post rule, where the winning 
candidates must receive a majority after a second round.59 The relatively new Corsican 
nationalists were not anywhere near getting a majority. In 1973, this led the leader of the Action 
 
58 Both of which are situations where the state security already seems tenuous at best and, therefore, are done to give 
a state better odds or more force in the coming violence, as opposed to preventing violence and maintaining citizen 
safety.  
59 de la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 399. 
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Regionaliste Corse (now called Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa), Edmond Siméoni, to refuse to 
field candidates in the legislative election and to, by 1975, turn to violence.60 The famous initial 
incident that got the attention of the French national government was the armed occupation of a 
vineyard in Aléria.61 The vineyard was selected because it belonged to a French-Algerian 
immigrant, many of whom were resettled in Corsica after Algeria’s independence. This 
highlights that there was a strong anti-immigrant sentiment, alongside the Corsican nationalism, 
at the core of the party’s ideology. In the recapture, two of the French security forces were killed 
and Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa was banned.62 This launched the Front de Libération 
Nationale Corse which fought by means of a terror campaign of bombings and assassination 
until 2014.63 Before diving into more election results for the nationalist movement, this persistent 
violence is important historical and political context and likely a crucial part of the governmental 
structure reforms that I am about to highlight.  
In 1982, prior to anything that could be considered an electoral success for the Corsican 
independence movement, the French government passed a “statut particulaier” (special status) 
for Corsica in an attempt to stop the violence.64 This allowed Corsica to elect a regional 
assembly based on proportional party representation. Unione di u Populu Corsu (the successor to 
Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa and led by another Siméoni brother, Max) ran in these regional 
elections, while the Front de Libération Nationale Corse and its political affiliates did not. With 
10.6% of the vote for the anti-violence Unione di u Populu Corsu, this was the first taste of 
 
60 de la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 400. 
61 Cecile Rossi, “‘There Was a Group of Capable People, but They Killed Each Other’: The Corsican Struggle Forty 
Years On,” OpenDemocracy, October 15, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/there-was-
group-of-capable-people-but-they-killed-each-other-corsica/.   
62 Ibid.   
63 Ibid.  
64 de la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 400.  
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electoral progress for Corsican nationalism.65 This is followed up with Corsican regionalists 
receiving 7.63% of the 1986 national legislative vote in Corse-du-Sud (the south and 
southwestern portions of the island) and 6.50% in Haute-Corse (the north and northeast 
portions).66 These promising results seem to indicate that, as expected by viability theory, 
support for Corsican nationalism was growing since integration but had been hidden by 
pragmatic voters and a nascent regionalist movement’s incompatibility with the majority-needed 
electoral system. Additionally, these results likely still underrepresent the Corsican regionalists 
because at least some of the pro-violence faction abstained from voting. However, there was also 
likely a boost from circumstances unrelated to viability theory such as excitement about the 
change in the electoral system and that the violence had actually been effective in forcing France 
to offer a concession. As these faded from voters’ minds, their boost probably wore off because 
the regionalists lost votes in the 1988 national legislature elections, dropping to 4.03% and 
6.55% in the two Corsican departments respectively.67 Additionally, divisions between the 
regionalists left them fractured and thus still relatively unsuccessful and impotent despite 
proportional representation in Corsica until the regional elections of 1992, which marked the first 
election of the new “Collectivité Territoriale” level of autonomy for the island.68  
 
65 de la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 400. 
66 Daniele Caramani, Elections in Western Europe Since 1815: Electoral Results by Constituencies, The Societies of 
Europe (London: Macmillan Reference, 2000), 365.; Since the French national government retained the two-round 
first-past-the-post system and this was not a majority in either department, this did not result in any nationally 
elected officials from a Corsican regionalist party. 
67 Caramani, Western Europe since 1815, 368.; This percentage of the vote is listed by Caramani as “other parties”, 
however, all major positions on the left-right cleavage are accounted for individually with the largest and most 
successful parties listed by name and all other parties grouped together as “other extreme-left parties” and “other 
right-wing groups”. Therefore, it is safe to assume that “other groups” receiving votes in Corsica are mostly, if not 
entirely, the regionalist parties.  
68 This new level of autonomy gave more powers to the regional assembly and designated an executive council. (de 
la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 400.) 
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     The Maastricht Treaty that created the European Union was officially signed in 
February 1992. It offered the benefits of common coordinated policies as a form of public goods 
(public goods benefit), greater security guarantees (security benefit), and the continuing of the 
common market (market benefit) to the people of Corsica.69 In the regional elections in March 
1992, the Corsican nationalists were boosted and captured 21.09% and 24.83% of the vote in the 
first and second rounds respectively.70 The regionalist parties in the election were Corsica 
Nazione and Corsica Demucrazia. It is unclear if Corsica Nazione was in favor of the creation of 
the European Union because it was an amalgamation of five different Corsican nationalist parties 
which included both pro-violence-anti-immigrants views and much more moderate and 
consensus-seeking positions.71 For this reason, the party did not take a stance on much besides 
that they represented the nation of Corsica. If this party’s increase in votes is, in part, because of 
the creation of the EU, it is unclear whether that would be voter enthusiasm for the possibilities 
opened by the EU or voter fears of Corsica ceding further sovereignty to the new institution. 
Since Corsica Demucrazia was anti-violence and seeking only greater autonomy for Corsica, it 
is likely they saw the new European Union positively because mainly pro-violence views were 
associated with the rhetoric of fearing the loss of Corsica’s power (which helped justify the fight 
to regain it).72 The following national elections saw a significant increase for the Corsican 
regionalists with them receiving 25.5% and 20.7% in Corse-du-Sud and Haute-Corse, 
respectively.73  However, going against the trend projected by the viability theory, the follow-up 
effort by the Corsican regionalist decreased in the regional election of 1998, down to 17.32% 
 
69 How the Maastricht Treaty triggers viability mechanisms is further explained in the Flanders section of this 
Chapter.  
70 de la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 406. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 402 
73 Caramani, Western Europe since 1815, 371.; Again, this is the total for ‘other parties’ but as explained in footnote 
67, it is safe to treat these ‘other parties’ as mostly or entirely regionalist within the Corsica context.  
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(first round) and 9.85% (second round).74 It seems that the strongest reason for this decrease is 
that, a month before the vote, Prefect Claude Erignac, the highest representative of the French 
government to the region of Corsica, was assassinated.75 One can see how this might ostracize 
voters.    
 In 2003, then French interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy, who would later become 
President of France, had a plan to decentralize his country and save some money by cutting 
down bureaucracy along the way. He organized for a referendum to take place in Corsica that 
would let the Corsican people vote on if they wanted more autonomy for themselves. In a very 
close 50.98% to 49.02% vote, the referendum did not pass, and more autonomy was defeated.76 
It would be a mistake not to mention this referendum when analyzing Corsican regionalism 
because it is the one opportunity in which Corsica has had to make a decision unilaterally, and 
the Corsican public’s decision against autonomy appears to be a major challenge to viability 
theory. A regionalist movement that is increasing in support should be expected to want more 
autonomy at every opportunity. Therefore, a defeat of the referendum would be a defeat to the 
movement. However, while undoubtedly a disappointment for the French government, it is 
unclear if this vote represents a defeat for the regionalists.77 The campaigning was extremely 
muddled as French politicians indicated that a vote for more autonomy would also mean an 
affirmation of the island’s attachment to France, so, while some regionalists supported more 
autonomy, others did not want to play into the government’s hand.78 As The Economist reported 
in the days following the elections, “the no vote, in short, was not a clear-cut rejection of the 
 
74 de la Calle and Fazi, “Frenchmen,” 406.; There is a 1997 French general election that I have been unable to find a 
reliable data point on with regards to specifically the Corsican departments.  
75 Rossi, “Capable People.”  
76 “Elections: Corsica Ref July 6 2003,” IFES Election Guide, https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/102/.  
77 "Europe: A Worrying Result; A Referendum in Corsica," The Economist, Jul 12, 2003, 33. 
https://www.economist.com/europe/2003/07/10/a-worrying-result.  
78 Ibid.  
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nationalist cause.”79 The explanation for why it was not clear-cut is that there were French 
national factions and Corsican regionalist factions in support of each outcome. Also, to be fair to 
viability theory, it supposes that greater integration with EU (in the key identified areas) leads to 
more and greater success for regionalism movements but does not say that these movements will 
never suffer defeats because greater success does not necessarily mean a majority consensus.  
Finally, following the most recent treaty of integration, the Treaty of Lisbon (market benefit), 
the Corsican regionalist movement has seen its greatest success. In the 2010 regional elections, 
the two regionalist parties Femu a Corsica and Corsica Libera received 27.8% (first round) and 
35.7% (second round) of the vote.80 These two parties teamed up to form Pè a Corsica for the 
2015 regional elections and, for the first time ever, a regionalist party captured the highest vote 
share with 35.34% (second round).81 This was followed up by an outright majority for Pè a 
Corsica in the 2017 regional elections with 56.5% of the votes.82 The 2017 regional elections 
were called quickly after the 2015 elections because the regional assembly voted to combine 
powers of the “Collectivité Territoriale” of Corsica with the powers of the two departments of 
Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud and form one government for the whole island called a 
“Collectivité Territoriale Unique.”83 This essentially worked out to be the same result as if the 
2003 referendum had succeeded, albeit more than a decade later. Ideologically, since Pè a 
 
79 The Economist, “A Referendum in Corsica.” 
80 Florent Gougou and Simon Labouret, “The 2010 French Regional Elections: Transitional Elections in a 
Realignment Era,” French Politics 8, no. 3 (2010): 335, 337. https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2010.17.  
81 “Corsica,” Nationalia, last modified December 2019, https://www.nationalia.info/profile/12/corsica.; “Régionales: 
Résultats des Élections Régionales 2015: Corse,” Ministère de l'Intérieur,  
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Regionales/elecresult__regionales-2015/(path)/regionales-
2015/94/index.html  
82 “Nationalists Win Corsica Election in Challenge for France,” BBC News, BBC, December 11, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42307274. 





Corsica is an alliance between two parties, it is focused on areas where the parties agree, namely 
mostly centrist or center-left policies politically and on greater autonomy for Corsica. It is 
important to note that Corsica Libera is staunchly pro-independence for the island while Femu a 
Corsica is only pro-autonomy.84 The party is helped by the leadership of Gilles Simeoni, the son 
of prominent Corsican nationalist Edmond Siméoni and the defense lawyer for Claude Erignac’s 
assassin.85 He (somewhat surprisingly) represents the pro-autonomy faction within the party yet 
is clearly not a French apologist and has legitimacy with the pro-independence cause. In my 
research, I have not found a stance by Pè a Corsica on if Corsica would seek to remain in the 
European Union, likely because that question is only relevant if the party agreed on Corsica 
needing to exist as an independent country which they do not. This party is likely content or 
unconcerned with the European status quo and, outside of not wanting foreigners to be able to 
buy holiday homes on the island, not taking a stance on greater European issues, preferring to 
stay focus on the regional issues at hand.86  
 This trend of electoral success regionally was repeated on the national scale. In the 2012 
national legislative elections, the Corsican regionalists showing was in line with the results since 
the boost at the creation of the EU in 1993.  As illustrated in Table 2 below, the regionalists saw 
an increase in success across the board in the national legislature elections of 2017. Pè a Corsica 
had three members elected to the French legislature, a first for the island’s regionalists. While 
this boost does not align neatly with the integration of the European Union, as there has been no 
new integration since 2009, I will propose three reasons for this increase, all of which were 
 
84 Nationalia, “Corsica.”  
85 Edmond Siméoni is mentioned in the 1970s part of this Corsica section and brother/uncle Max Siméoni is 
mentioned in the 1980s part of this Corsica section as well.  
86 Kim Willsher, “Corsica Calls for Greater Autonomy from France after Election,” The Guardian, December 11, 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/11/macron-corsica-dilemma-nationalists-election-gains-france.  
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potentially acting as obstacles to Corsican regionalists receiving the boost from integration 
expected by viability theory.  
Table 2: 
Data from Ministère de l'Intérieur, “Législatives.” 
The first is that the Corsican regionalists, after decades of fielding competing and 
everchanging political parties, finally presented a unified party to the region through the alliance 
party of Pè a Corsica. The reason this is impactful is that, as stated before, there is not 
proportional representation for these elections, so fractured movements and newly formed parties 
are at a disadvantage by being seen as not established enough to be first-past-the-post. The 
second reason is that the successes at a regional level, particularly the election of 2015 and the 
centralization of Corsican autonomy as a “Collectivité Territoriale Unique” translated into belief 
that the regionalism movement could be beneficial at the national level.87 The final reason is the 
abandonment, widely if not completely, of the use of violence by the Corsican nationalists in 
2014. Viability theory, with its focus on election results, is grounded in the assumptions of a 
democratic and mainly peaceful process and resolution for regionalist political goals. It is not a 
theory on rebellions, uprisings, or civil strife. For this reason, regionalist violence is not taken 
into account. Additionally, there is no claim made on how regionalist violence moderates the 
 
87 The law that formed the “Collectivité Territoriale Unique” was passed before the 2017 legislative elections but 
would only come into effect in 2018. Still, this move towards more autonomy would be viewed as a success for the 
regionalists from the time it was passed and that boost in belief or perception would not require implementation.  
Election: 2012 (R1% / R2% / Seat Won?) 2017 (R1% / R2% /Seat Won?) 
Haute-Corse 1st Seat 28.03 / 31.22 / No 30.42 / 60.81 / Yes  
Haute-Corse 2nd Seat 16.98 / ------- / No 36.44 / 63.16 / Yes 
Corse-du-Sud 1st Seat 15.63 / ------- / No 21.41 / ------- / No 
Corse-du-Sud 2nd Seat  29.27 / 46.91 / No 29.10 / 55.22 / Yes  
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projected effects of integration. However, in the case of Corsica, it seems that violence was a 
significant part of the early movement as it brought attention to the cause and yielded an 
important early change in the regional-level electoral system. This was different by the 1990s, 
when, while prior Corsican nationalist violence had been mostly viewed as politically motivated, 
increasingly the Corsican nationalists who chose to use violence came to be viewed as common 
criminals and associates of larger organized crime rings.88 Therefore, by the time violence 
stopped, it had been hurting the regionalism movement in perception as well as the human costs 
that come with members being killed or imprisoned.89 Thus, the violence needed to end before 
Corsican regionalism could experience greater success.  
 Looking to the future with the Corsican independence movement, the most recent results 
(Table 2) give a reason for optimism for the future of Corsican regionalism. However, it will be 
interesting to see if the Pè a Corsica alliance will be able to continue. If it can, then Pè a Corsica 
will continue to negotiate with mainland France for greater power or further referendums. 
Eventually, France may give in to these demands by giving greater autonomy, and, by tactically 
doing so, could cause the collapse of Pè a Corsica as the Femu a Corsica party will be satisfied 
with the greater autonomy and Corsica Libera will continue to push for outright independence. 
A smaller Corsican independence party has already started campaigning for an independence 
referendum in 2032. This shows how far away an independent Corsica still is, even for its most 
ardent supporters, and, if the moment’s violence and political fragmentation were to return, it 
could be even farther.     
 
88 Jean-Louis Briquet, “‘Drift into Mafiadom’? Political Violence and Criminality in the Corsican Nationalist 
Movement,” in Organized Crime and States, ed. Jean-Louis Briquet and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 197, 199-200. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230110038_9.   
89 Rossi, “Capable People.” 
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Chapter 2  
Sardinia and Padania  
In this chapter, I will examine the Sardinian and Padanian regionalist movements. I will 
start with Sardinia by, first, briefly discussing its composition and history and then reviewing the 
origins of the regionalism movement. I will then go through the European integration that occurs 
in Sardinia, explain how it triggers viability theory, and then analyze the electoral results that 
follow. Because of electoral reform in Italy in the 1990s that favored large nation-wide parties, I 
will pay special attention to Sardinian regional elections starting after the reform. I end the 
section considering the future of Sardinian regionalism. Then, for Padania, I first define the term 
Padania and the territory of Padanian regionalism. Next, I show the origins of the different 
regionalism movements that coalesced into Padanian regionalism. After that, I will focus on how 
European integration has impacted the primary Padanian regionalist party of Lega Nord. I end by 
offering some thought on the co-opting of regionalist parties for non-regionalist ends and finally, 
a look to the future. 
Sardinia  
Having just analyzed Corsica, I now transition to its southern island neighbor of Sardinia. 
Sardinia is bigger than Corsica, the second-largest island in the Mediterranean, and is west of the 
mainland of its current country, Italy. As an island, the Sardinian independence movement’s 
territorial claim is easily defined as the island and the surrounding outlying islets. Italian is 
widely spoken, but Sardo, the Sardinian language with its two main dialects of Sard and Sardu, is 
the historical and cultural language of the island.1  Catalan and Arabic are also spoken.2 The 
 
1 “The Language Of Sardinia,” Total Sardinia, last modified February 18, 2020, https://totalsardinia.com/language/. 
2  Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Sardinia,” accessed February 20, 2021, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Sardinia-island-Italy.    
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economy relies on agriculture and tourism, but is decently diversified; however, the population 
density of the island is quite low, compared to the rest of Italy.3 Historically, Italy is one of the 
most recently formed countries of western and southern Europe. In fact, the Kingdom of Sardinia 
was the leading power in the Italian unification process. However, the Kingdom of Sardinia is a 
misnomer because it was based in the city of Turin in mainland Europe. The island of Sardinia 
was only a periphery part of its eponym kingdom. This periphery status would continue as part 
of Italy.  
The first modern era Sardinian regionalist movement was the Partito Sardo d’Azione 
(Sardinian Action Party, 1921). This party emerged through the leadership of a Sardinian section 
of the Italian army that had fought in the Great War, particularly the ex-soldier, Emilio Lussu.4 
This section was composed of soldiers from all over Sardinia, and thus, when the soldiers 
returned, they now felt a commonality with their fellow soldiers and those soldiers’ different 
island communities. This consciousness spread, and a subset of the population identified 
themselves with Sardinia as a whole, instead of solely identifying with smaller, more locality-
based subdivisions. The initial platform of Partito Sardo d’Azione was that Sardinia needed 
autonomy within Italy, not independence, to protect the newfound Sardinian identity, the historic 
language(s), and the island’s culture.5  
This message was well received and in the Italian general election of 1921, Partito Sardo 
d’Azione received 28.76% of the vote in the voting district of Cagliari e Sassari, which 
encompassed all and only Sardinia.6  Cagliari is the island’s largest city and now the de facto 
 
3 “Sardinia,” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. 
4 Eve Hepburn, “Explaining Failure: the Highs and Lows of Sardinian Nationalism,” Regional and Federal Studies 
19, no. 4-5 (2009): 597, https://doi.org/10.1080/13597560903310378.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Daniele Caramani, Elections in Western Europe Since 1815: Electoral Results by Constituencies, The Societies of 
Europe (London: Macmillan Reference, 2000), 650.; Other sources report this number as high as 36% of the vote. I 
have not analyzed the reason for this discrepancy, but since, both, my focus is on integration through the EU, of 
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capital city, located along the southern bay, and Sassari is the second-largest city, near the 
northwest coast.7 This illustrates that the concept of a united Sardinia was yet to be reflected in 
the electoral naming division. Elections would stop under fascist Italy, but the electoral district 
representing Sardinia would be called Sardinia by the time elections are resumed after World 
War II, a small effect caused by the Partito Sardo d’Azione. In the last general elections of 1924 
before Benito Mussolini took power and ended them, Partito Sardo d’Azione received 24,059 
votes8 with netted them 4 seats.9 Partito Sardo d’Azione would have to stop competing as a 
political force for fear of violence, but ultimately, Sardinian regionalism has a strong initial 
showing to start from once Fascist Italy collapses, the Second World War ends, and elections 
resume. 
Throughout Italy’s fascist period, the Partito Sardo d’Azione essentially broke in two. 
The party had never taken an ideological stance, only uniting under the banner of greater 
autonomy. Therefore, the conservatives in the party decided to join the fascists in exchange for 
autonomy.10 What this “autonomy” amounted to was Mussolini rewarding the island with 
money, but no delegation of any autonomous powers to Sardinia.11 Conversely, Lussu favored a 
socialist left stance, and, while underground, this faction of the party became a party of anti-
fascism and labor rights.12 Ultimately, this division, and partial association with fascism, hurt the 
 
which there was none at this time, and the fact that the Italian political system was very volatile in the interwar 
years, the point that a significant part of Sardinia supported regionalism prior to any integration is conveyed with 
either percentage. 
7 Cagliari would only become the capital city of the Sardinia region after the creation of regions by the Italian 
Constitution following the Second World War. It was however a historical capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia, prior 
to the Kingdom moving its capital to Turin.  
8 As for what percentage of the vote that is, I could not find a reliable data point; however, it does appear that Partito 
Sardo d’Azione was the second most popular party in Sardinia.  
9 Nohlen and Stöver, Elections in Europe, 1069. 
10 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 597.  
11 Ibid., 598. 
12 Ibid., 598.  
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party in the 1946 elections to the Constituent Assembly. Partito Sardo d’Azione managed a still 
decent 14.89% of the vote, but nonetheless a decrease.13  
The reason this result provides important context for analyzing Sardinian regionalism 
going forward is because the Partito Sardo d’Azione was working to get a Special Statute for 
Sardinia into the new Italian constitution, which would achieve their autonomist aims, but they 
were so hindered by the division and loss of support that the Italian government took over this 
initiative.14 The autonomists still technically succeeded in gaining special recognition but instead 
of gaining any devolved powers, they gained the right to financial considerations (again) from 
mainland Italy and Italian-directed help in achieving modernization.15 This did not satisfy the 
Sardinian regionalist supporters nor their own politicians, with Lussu saying of Sardinian 
autonomy, “this autonomy might as well fit into the family of federalism like a cat into the 
lion’s.”16 By this, he indicated Sardinia’s status was within the concept of federalism but not 
what one thought off or wanted when one did desire federalism or autonomy. To make matters 
worse, in 1948, Lussu started another party, Partito Sardo d’Azione Socialista (Socialist Sardinia 
Action Party, 1948) which got 6.6% of the vote that year and brought regular flavor Partito 
Sardo d’Azione down to 10.5% in the same election.17 Therefore, as Italy and Sardinia entered 
the first round of European integration, the Sardinian regionalism movement, due to division and 
lack of real achievement, was quickly losing momentum and entering a state of failure.  
The first round of European integration in Italy occurred in 1952 with the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community. I have discussed the reasons for this integration in the 
 
13 Caramani, Western Europe since 1815, 653. 
14 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 599.  
15 Ibid.   
16 Giangiacomo Ortu, “Emilio Lussu, L'autonomia Come Valore Morale,” La Nuova Sardegna (Sassari), November 
6, 2019, https://www.lanuovasardegna.it/tempo-libero/2019/11/05/news/lussu-l-autonomia-come-valore-morale-
1.37850286. 
17 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 598. 
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Flanders section of Chapter 1, but here I will address Italy’s motivation to join specifically. Since 
the country was seen as unlikely to be the aggressor or defender in a future war over these 
resources (like France, Germany, or the Benelux countries), the European Coal and Steel 
Community presented Italy with the opportunity of economic and regional prestige benefits.18 
However, I argue that aside from the ability to purchase raw materials at a better price (market 
benefit), the effects of the ECSC were least impactful in Italy, as well as delayed because Italy 
requested and received a longer transitional period to attempt to help its affected industries 
prepared for greater competition.19 I have also speculated in the Corsica section of Chapter 1 that 
a lack of industries directly involved in this round of European integration might hinder the 
viability theory’s effect. However, Sardinia does have a very large coal mine that is an important 
part of its economy.20 For that reason, after the transitional delay, Sardinia was directly impacted 
by the ECSC. Also, NATO’s 1949 creation would be triggering the guaranteeing of security 
mechanism (security benefit), and, by the Treaty of Rome in 1958, all three other viability theory 
mechanisms would be triggered in the form of a common market (market benefit), common trade 
policies and a customs union (public goods benefit), and the European Social Fund (structural 
funds benefit). Therefore, the following election results do not seem to correlate with this 




18 “Reactions in Italy,” From the Schuman Plan to the Paris Treaty (1950–1952), CVCE, last modified September 9, 
2016, https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-f5f9e6c01023/c793e341-
a1dd-4bf5-a6be-b317cb6a3eff.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Giuliana Rossi, “Seismic tomography in Monte Sinni (Sardinia, Italy) Coal Mine,” Bollettino di Geofisica Teorica 





Table 3: Electoral Performance of Partito Sardo d’Azione in Italian general elections 
Year Votes Vote Percentage Seats  
1948 Chamber  61,928  10.26% (n/a) 1 
1948 Senate  65,743 12.73% (n/a) 1  
1953 Chamber 24,990   3.86% ( -6.40)  0  
1953 Senate 34,484   6.05% ( -6.68) 0 
1958 Chamber  None  N/A N/A 
1958 Senate 25,923   4.15% ( -1.90) 0 
1963 Chamber None N/A N/A 
1963 Senate  34,954   5.58% (+1.43) 0 
1968 Chamber 27,228   3.61% ( -0.25) 0 
1968 Senate 25,891   3.87% ( -1.71) 0 
1972 Chamber  None N/A N/A 
1972 Senate21  189,534 26.83% (n/a) 3 
1976 Chamber None N/A N/A 
1976 Senate None  N/A N/A 
1979 Chamber 17,673   1.91% ( -1.70) 0 
1979 Senate 15,766   2.07% ( -1.80) 0 
Data from Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali.  
What the table above shows is that the Sardinian regionalism movement saw no boost in 
its electoral performance in the three decades following the ECSC and two decades following the 
EEC. It was not completely defeated because Partito Sardo d’Azione found a little power once as 
 
21 Coalition with PCI and PSIUP  
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part of a coalition in 1972 and was still able to get seats at a regional level, though never with 
more than 8% of the vote.22 Still, this Sardinian example needs to be explained. One might say 
that this proves that viability theory is wrong. I would argue that that line of reasoning should be 
phrased as this proves that viability theory is not always a sufficient explanation. However, since 
this study on how European integration has impacted regionalist political parties’ electoral 
support uses the viability theory lens, I am going to consider some possible reasons why the 
Sardinian regionalist did not see the electoral boost they ought to be receiving underneath the 
surface.  
The first possibility is that Sardinian regionalism was so damaged by pre-integration 
events that integration was doing its best to keep the movement on life support. One half of the 
Partito Sardo d’Azione was stained by its association with fascism, while the other half had had 
a shot to achieve promised autonomy and failed to achieve it during the creation of the Italian 
Constitution. The party leaders admitted this failure and so the former supporters could be 
forgiven for giving up hope or for believing that infighting would again bungle the next 
opportunity should that ever come around.23  
Another possibility is that European integration was not part of the Sardinian political 
discussion. Regionalism and independence movement expert Dr. Eve Hepburn, whose article on 
Sardinian nationalism’s failure has been instrumental in my construction of the Sardinian 
regionalist history writes,  
Since its inception, the Psd’Az [Partito Sardo d’Azione] has consistently adopted a pro-
European attitude, envisioning Sardinian self-determination within a wider Europe of the 
 
22 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 599.; In other cases studies within this paper, I have chosen to dive into the 
regional level when it helps emphasize a trend that would otherwise be less clear at the national level; however in 




Peoples. … However, there have been some problems with the Psd’Az’s use of Europe to 
find solutions to its territorial demands. First, during this period of direct Sardinian 
representation in Europe, all of the mainstream parties in Sardinia became pro-European. 
However, the difficulty here was that Europe also became unproblematic in Sardinian 
politics: party approaches to European integration were (and remain) reactive and 
uncritical, at least when policies do not affect Sardinian economic interests.24 
The pro-European stance aligns with viability theory’s identified trend for regionalist movements 
to see and frame their future as within the EU. The second part of the quotation points out that 
European integration was a non-issue, so it did not enter the political conversation. Therefore, 
while Partito Sardo d’Azione was framing Sardinia’s future as within Europe, so was everyone 
else. Conversely, this means there is no emergence of a Eurosceptic regionalist faction, which 
while often taking a more nuanced or antagonistic approach to greater integration, is often quite 
set on taking an in-your-face approach to constructing and promoting a nationalist identity.25 It 
should be noted that the different factors presented are not exclusive (except when in 
contradiction) and therefore they could all be factors. 
 In 1980, Partito Sardo d’Azione adopted a pro-independence stance, moving away from 
decades of being an autonomist party, and also started campaigning in support of the official 
recognition and use of Sardo.26 They received 9.5% of the vote in Sardinia in the 1983 general 
election, good for one seat plus a similar result gave them one seat in the senate as well.27 This 
was a huge upswing for the party, but what is interesting is that no new European integration had 
 
24 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 600-602. 
25 This is to say a nationalist identity for the region, not the larger nation-state.  
26 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 600. 
27 Caramani, Western Europe since 1815, 666.  
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occurred. I believe that switching up the party’s stance was the main reason for the increase in 
support.  
They were further benefited from and by Europe through the start of elections to the 
European Parliament. Though grouped with the much more populous Sicily for their European 
representation district, Partito Sardo d’Azione got one representative elected in 1984.28 This was 
the second-ever European Parliamentary elections and the first ones in which the Partito Sardo 
d’Azione took part. This success was followed up with an increase to 11.92% of the vote in the 
1987 general Italian election, good for two representatives and the maintaining of one senator.29  
The start of European direct elections is not within the scope of viability theory because 
its implementation alone does not trigger any of the mechanisms. However, these European 
elections gave the Sardinian nationalists a stage and place where their message was amplified. 
The best illustration of this amplification is the Partito Sardo d’Azione’s status as an early 
member of the European parliament political party, the European Free Alliance, which was 
comprised of other regionalist movements united in a belief in the rights of regions within the 
EU.30 The party would retain its seat in the 1989 European Parliament elections.31 However, 
after spending some of the 1980s in power at a regional level and having little to show for it, 
support for the Sardinian nationalists would fade at the start of the 1990s and be existentially 
threatened in 1993.32  
 In 1993, after a major corruption scandal brought down the major parties of the Italian 
political system, it was decided that the system need to be reformed. This reform created a mixed 
 
28 “European election results - 1984 - European Union,” European Parliament, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/previous-elections.   
29 Caramani, Western Europe since 1815, 668.  
30 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 601.  
31 European Parliament, “European election results - 1989 - European Union.” 
32Similar to footnote 22, the trend of Partito Sardo d’Azione doing better in elections throughout the 1980s is 
reflected at the regional level.   
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majoritarian and proportional representation electoral system in place of the solely proportional 
representation system and was intended to reduce the fragmentation of the political system.33 
However, as the Sardinian regionalists were a smaller party constrained to a less densely 
populated region, they saw this as a threat to their existence and went to Rome to protest in the 
street against the change, to no avail.34 The party was probably right about the threat this change 
presented as neither Partito Sardo d’Azione nor the other Sardinian regionalist parties that have 
formed since 1993 (which I will talk about more later in this section) have gotten a seat at the 
national level, aside from in 1996 when Partito Sardo d’Azione joined the alliance that won 
nationally thus receiving a senate seat.35 Despite all the further integration started by the 1993 
Maastricht treaty that created the European Union, in terms of percentage of the vote in Sardinia 
for the national level elections, Sardinian regionalists in the 21st century have not broken 4% 
when combined which falls to 3% since 2001.36 Though I have critiqued other scholars in this 
study for losing faith in a movement too early, it appears at least for the moment the bipolar 
electoral system in Italy is proving an insurmountable challenge to national representation for 
Sardinian regionalism.  
  However, thanks to the Partito Sardo d’Azione getting special, if albeit disappointing, 
status in the Italian Constitution, there is one more place to look for the expected trends of 
viability theory for Sardinia: the regional council. Up to this point, Sardinia has provided little 
evidence for viability theory and some evidence against its universality. Therefore, the following 
trend, since the 1993 Maastricht treaty which triggered the providing a public good mechanism 
 
33 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 608. 
34 Ibid., 609. 
35 Ibid., 602.  





(public good benefit) and the guaranteeing security mechanism (security benefit) as well as 
creating the economic benefits that come with the Euro currency (market benefit) and continuing 
all previous integration, is intriguing.37 To start Sardinian regionalists received 7.9% of the 
regional vote in 1994.38 This is down from 1989, but there are two reasons for this. First, the 
electoral reform of 1993 and the damping of hopes and spirits that caused was likely lingering. 
Second, the Sardinian regionalism movement had fractured for the first time in forty-five years, 
and Sardigna Natzione (Sardinia Nation, 1994) entered the fray. 
Sardigna Natzione was not happy with Partito Sardo d’Azione tendency to collaborate 
and enter alliances with the major ideological Italian parties without achieving tangible benefits 
for the Sardinian nationalist cause. Sardigna Natzione declared that they would not collaborate 
with any party, left or right, that was not committed to Sardinian self-determination, essentially 
rejecting the left-right axis of politics.39 They would, however, form an alliance with Partito 
Sardo d’Azione from 2001 to 2004.40 Sardigna Natzione represents the start of a trend of 
fragmentation and proliferation of political parties in Sardinia regionalist politics. In the 1999 
Sardinia regional election, despite no Sardinian party getting more than 5% of the vote, four 
parties, including the two I have named, combined for 14.8%, an increase of about 7%.41 In the 
2004 Sardinian regional election, seven parties together received 27.3% of the vote, though none 
received more than 8% alone.42 This is a 12.5% increase and a doubling in the number of seats 
 
37 For a further explanation of how these mechanisms were triggered, see the Flanders section of Chapter 1.   
38 “Sardinia,” Parties and Elections in Europe, http://parties-and-elections.eu/sardinia.html.   
39 Hepburn, “Explaining Failure,” 604.; This is not to say that the party did not have an ideological position. They 
did. It was vague socialist leanings, so left or center-left. They merely did not let their ideological leanings be a 
place for common ground without Sardinian nationalism.   
40 Ibid., 609. 
41 Parties and Elections in Europe, “Sardinia.”  
42 “Elezioni Regionali: Anno 2004,” Sardegna Elezioni. http://www.regione.sardegna.it/Elezioni-
2004/risultati/Riassuntivo_def.htm.   
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for Sardinian regionalist parties. The 2009 Sardinian regional election was down to 21.9% for 
seven Sardinia regionalist parties.43 This is still pretty good given the region’s history.  
The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2009, giving the European Union more power to 
negotiate trade deals on behalf of the member countries. This further triggered the economic 
viability mechanism of having greater leverage in trade deals (market benefit). This strengthens 
regionalist arguments about maintaining larger market access or more favorable market 
conditions. The viability theory appears to be in play at the 2014 regional elections with a vote 
increase for, now, sixteen Sardinian regionalist parties to 33.69% total.44 Finally, in the most 
recent regional election of 2019, nine Sardinian regionalist parties captured 30.13%.45 This was a 
small 3.56% decrease in total vote percentage, but the seat total remained the same, and Christian 
Solinas, leader of Partito Sardo d’Azione, helped form a coalition government that made him the 
Sardinian President.46 In the end, there is some evidence on the regional level for viability theory 
still being reflected in the Sardinia case.  
Looking to the future, Sardinia still has three big issues standing in its path to attempting 
independence. This independence would likely be un-controversially within the European Union, 
in the minds of the Sardinian people at least. This is not certain though as the Partito Sardo 
d’Azione is currently in a coalition government, and has a history of past alliances with Lega 
Nord, a right-wing, regionalist, Eurosceptic party (which I will explain more on in the following 
 
43 “Elezioni Regionali: Anno 2009,” Sardegna Elezioni. 
http://www.regione.sardegna.it/argomenti/attivita_istituzionali/elezioni2009/risultatiriassuntivi.html.   
44 “Elezioni Regionali: Anno 2014,” Sardegna Elezioni. 
http://www.regione.sardegna.it/index.php?xsl=2187&s=1&v=9&c=11988&t=1&tb=11625&st=20&opt=risultati_ria
ssuntivi&t=1&tb=11625&st=20.   
45 “Regionali 2019,” Sardegna Elezioni. 
https://www.regione.sardegna.it/speciali/elezioniregionali2019/risultatiriassuntivi.html.; Though I double verified 
the numbers, special thanks to the editors of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sardinian_nationalism for doing the math 
on these regional election totals. 
46 “Sardinia,” Nationalia, last modified November 2020, https://www.nationalia.info/profile/41/sardinia.  
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Padania section). The first issue is that Sardinian regionalists do not have a history of achieving 
substantive gains for their cause when they do come into power. This is best exemplified by the 
failure to achieve satisfactory autonomy in Sardinia’s special statute within the Italian 
Constitution. They would obviously need to rectify this. The second is that Sardinian regionalism 
has become extremely fragmented in the 21st century. If the Sardinian independence movement 
could present as one unified voice instead of eight or sixteen different parties, they would be able 
to win pluralities at the regional level and negotiate with the national government with greater 
leverage. That brings up the third issue which is the inability to compete nationally. With the 
exception of overlapping with the goals of other Italian regionalist movements, there is no one 
advocating for Sardinian regionalism within the national government. The system setup, as 
explained, and the relatively sparse population make it hard for there to be a large or forceful 
Sardinian perspective in Rome. Additionally, national parties in Italy are adapting to the 
Sardinian parties’ growth. The national parties now have branches of the main ideological party 
specifically tailored to different regions including Sardinia, so the Sardinian regionalist parties 
are not even the only promoters of their primary issue. This might actually work in favor of the 
Sardinian independence movement, but since no concessions or decentralization have been made 
by these parties, it is unclear if this stance is lip service or a genuine goal. Either way, it hurts the 
electoral prospects of the parties mainly focused on Sardinian regionalism. All in all, Sardinia 
has been a rough proving ground for the viability theory and its own regionalism movement.    
Padania  
 Padania was a natural choice when choosing which regionalism movements to study 
because it is the home region of the most powerful regionalist party in Italy and among the most 
powerful in Europe, Lega Nord per I’Indipendenza della Padania (Northern League for the 
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Independence of Padania, 1991, commonly abbreviated to Lega Nord or just Lega). However, a 
definition of what comprises the region of Padania is the most unclear of any of the regions of 
this study. It is conceptually thought of as the northern part of Italy. There is a lot of ambiguity 
about where the north of Italy starts, as well as questions about northern parts of the country not 
along, or within the hinterlands of, the Po river from which the literal name of Padania derives 
meaning. Additionally, Lega Nord has been successful as a regionalist party at capturing votes in 
regions that are clearly not within Padania such as Sardinia or Sicily, so it is not just any area 
where the Padanian regionalists compete.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, I am going to use the most restrictive definition 
of Padanian territory because it is the least controversial and, if one agrees that Padania exists, 
then it will always include the defined territories. Additionally, these territories were compiled 
by communist Guido Fanti in 1975 and were all represented by one of the six smaller regionalist 
parties in the first alliance that formed the right-wing Lega Nord, so there should be agreement 
across the ideological spectrum.47 Without further ado, Padania is the Italian regions of 
Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia.48 This excludes Aosta Valley, Trentino and 
South Tyrol, and Friuli Venezia Giulia in the geographic north of Italy. They have likely been 
excluded from the definition criteria above due to having strong regionalism movements not 
associated with Padania. Tuscany, despite being the location of the sixth founding Lega Nord 
political party, is borderline central Italy, and its inclusion would likely require the inclusion of 
 
47 “Addio a Guido Fanti, Inventore della ‘Lega del Po,’” l’Indipendenza (Online), February 12, 2012, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140413150402/http://www.lindipendenza.com/guido-fanti/.  
48 Emilia is one half of the Italian administrative region Emilia-Romagna. For practical reasons, when considering 
electoral results, this study will use the results of Emilia-Romagna as a whole, as all regionalist parties within the 
region campaign within the whole region.  
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the other central regions of Marche and Umbria despite these being controversial and sometimes 
seen as an overreach of Lega Nord’s ambition. 
Historically there is no past state or kingdom that serves as a legacy for Padania, but 
instead, Padania serves as a conduit for several historically independent regions to work together. 
These historical independent international actors include Cisalpine Gaul (loosely the whole 
region from a Roman point of view), the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia (for the Lombardy and 
Veneto regions), the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia (for the Piedmont and Liguria regions), and 
the Most Serene Republics of Genoa (also for the Liguria region) and Venice (also for the 
Veneto region).  Linguistically, Padania has a language or dialect for each of the five regions – 
Piedmontese, Ligurian, Lombard, Venetian, and Emiliano-Romagnolo.49 These languages have a 
common Gallo-Italic language family which differs from the rest of Italy.50 Finally, Padania (and 
northern Italy more generally) is the wealthiest part of the country, and therefore there exists a 
perception that the Padanian North subsidizes the South.51 This perception is often used in the 
construction of the Padania identity.52 
 A challenge posed by Padania to this study is that it did not exist prior to European 
integration so there is no obvious pre-integration data point. However, viability theory projects 
the emergence of new regionalism movements, and Padanian regionalism’s emergence would fit 
within this category. The way I am going to approach showing this initial data point is by 
working backwards a bit. The Lega Nord, which holds the mantle as the primary promoter of 
 
49 Map of Italian Dialects, FluentU, 2018, https://www.fluentu.com/blog/italian/wp-
content/uploads/sites/23/2018/08/italian-dialects.png.  
50 Technically Venetian is mostly classified as Italo-Dalmatian but occasionally grouped into the Gallo-Italic family.   
51 “Income of households by NUTS 2 regions,” Eurostat, last modified March 31, 2021, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nama_10r_2hhinc/default/table?lang=en.;  
 John Phillips, "The Struggle for 'Padania,'" Maclean's (Toronto), Oct 28, 1996, 30.  
52 Benito Giordano, “A Place Called Padania?: The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of Northern 




Padania regionalism, began with five smaller regionalist parties within the Padania area.53 I will 
then briefly continue backward from each of these five regionalist trajectories looking for each 
one’s start. While not all of these movements will have started prior to integration, they almost 
all started before the late 1980s. This is good for viability theory. If integration is indeed linked 
with regionalist electoral growth, it would be strange for Padanian regionalism to come out of 
almost thin air after forty years of integration. A reasonable person would likely attribute that to 
another factor. I will show that this is not what happened, but in fact, the Padania regionalism 
movement’s beginning is a pragmatic, yet unusual, step taken within the context of steady 
regionalist emergence and growth. As throughout this study, European integration will provide 
the context.  
 Veneto regionalism likely has the most clear-cut start. The Republic of Venice existed for 
1100 years and was annexed by Italy fairly late in the Italian unification process. The first 
Veneto regionalist party appeared in the 1921 general election. It was called the Leone di San 
Marco (Lion of Saint Mark, 1921) after the famous lion emblem on the Republic of Venice flag. 
The party received 6.1% of the vote in the province of Treviso, a modest showing.54 It was 
promptly suppressed by fascism. Starting in the 1960s, the Movimento Autonoma Regionalista 
Veneto (Venetian Regionalist Autonomist Movement), while not a political party, attempted to 
convince the public of Italy that all regions should have institutions at least similar to those with 
a special statute.55 This development occurred shortly after the creation of the European 
Economic Community in 1958. The Moviemento Autonoma Regionalista Veneto ultimately 
 
53 Apologies to Tuscany. 
54 Patrik Riondato, “Storia Autonomismo Veneto,” Etnie, last modified February 13, 2005, 
https://www.rivistaetnie.com/storia-autonomismo-veneto/. 
55 Ibid.; Sardinia was one of the regions that had this special statute since the creation of the Italian Constitution. The 
statute is explained more in-depth in that section.  
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succeeded in its goal, with all regions holding regional elections in 1970. They just no longer 
existed to partake in them.  
It then takes ten years and until the third regional election for a full-fledged Venetian 
regionalist party to get votes, but that is exactly what Liga Veneta (Venetian League, 1979) does, 
receiving 0.47% of the vote in the 1980 Veneto regional election.56 This is followed up with 
4.3% of the vote in Veneto for the 1983 general elections, which yields the party one 
representative in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.57 Various divisions and 
expulsions occur within the party following this first electoral success.58 Because of the party 
infighting, the electoral numbers for Liga Veneta drop in the 1985 regional elections to 3.7%.59 
This was still acceptable to Liga Veneta because they received their first representation at the 
regional level in the form of two representatives.60 The slight decline and the internal 
disagreements continue through the 1987 general election with Liga Veneta receiving 3.07% of 
the vote.61  
This gradual declining trend and ambition for European representation leads Liga Veneta 
to strike up a deal with other regionalist groups within the Padania area to form an alliance 
(Alleanza Nord) for the 1989 European elections.62 The alliance works, and the regionalists 
secure two seats in the European Parliament.63 It is important to point out that the reason for this 
alliance is the European Union elections. While this is not a mechanism for viability theory, it is 
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an example of European integration causing a regionalism movement to coalesce. This alliance 
quickly cements itself in a single political party with a “nation-level” branch for each comprising 
area. This is the emergence of Padanian regionalism as this political party is the Lega Nord. 
  The name of the next region, Lombardy, comes from the Late Antiquity kingdom of the 
Lombards. The region is centered around the city of Milan and is the most populous region in 
Italy. This region along, with Veneto are the two most prominent regions with regards to Padania 
regionalism. The first sign of a Lombardy regionalism movement is the Movimento Autonomista 
Bergamasco (Bergamasque Autonomist Movement, 1956). Originally, this movement just 
desired greater local autonomy and happened to be based out of the city of Bergamo.64 Similar to 
the Movimento Autonoma Regionalista Veneto mentioned above, its main goal became to 
achieve regional powers that were at least equal to the special statutes issued to a few regions in 
the Italian Constitution. 
The movement renamed itself Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Lombarda 
(Lombard Regional Autonomy Movement, 1957) and joined other regionalists in the Movimento 
Autonomie Regionali Padane (Padanian Regional Autonomy Movement).65 The shift to a 
regional identity of the party coincides with the creation of the European Economic 
Communities and the public discourse on the conceptualization of a united Europe that came 
along with it. This potentially signals that instead of thinking on the scale of local autonomy 
within Italy, the Lombardy regionalists were now thinking on the scale of regional autonomy 
within Europe. However, the Movimento Autonomie Regionali Padane does not get any of its 
politicians elected in the 1958 election and does worse in total number of votes in the larger 
 
64 George Newth, “The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord: Continuities and Discontinuities,” 
Modern Italy 23, no. 3 (2018): 237-238. https://doi.org/10.1017/mit.2018.4.  
65 Ibid., 238.; Yes, this includes the Movimento Autonoma Regionalista Veneto.  
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Bergamo-Brescia electoral district when compared to how the Movimento Autonomista 
Bergamasco did in the previous Bergamo commune elections alone.66 The movement ends in 
dissolution with the Lombardy-based faction giving up its regionalist identity and joining the 
mainstream Christian Democrat party.67 Those that are not happy with this continue on as 
Unione Autonomisti d’Italia (Italian Autonomist Union, 1961) but would remain insignificant in 
elections and without a precise Lombardy or Padanian regionalist message, instead opting solely 
for the pursuit of decentralization throughout Italy.68  
Political scientist George Newth also points out that ideologically the Unione 
Autonomisti d’Italia (and its predecessor movements) were drawing favorably on European 
integration in their messaging which is to be expected within viability theory. He says, “In this 
sense, the UAI were talking of a Europe of the Regions even before the concept had officially 
emerged after the evolution of the European Economic Community into the European Union.”69 
This is important to show that even the EEC stage of integration was enough integration to start 
the conversation on the viability of regionalism at the regional level before the conversation 
makes its way up to the supranational level. The Unione Autonomisti d’Italia briefly revived its 
Padanian regionalist identity when it called its electoral list in the 1970 regional elections 
“Libera Padania” which means Free Padania in a hope to capitalize on past autonomist 
sentiment.70 They received 0.06% of the Lombardy vote and would not partake in another 
election.71 The important thing to note here is that the Alleanza Nord for a united Padania was 
not an original idea and, though the Lega Nord is a not descendent of this movement, the 
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groundwork was laid for the Lega Nord to come back to, for historical precedent, on Padanian 
regionalism.  
 The party that first came back to Lombardy regionalism was Lega Lombarda (Lombard 
League, 1984). This name was chosen by leader Umberto Bossi as a historical allusion to the 
Lombard League, an alliance that fought for Northern Italian city-states to maintain their 
autonomy from a centralizing Holy Roman Empire.72 Bossi was a charismatic left-leaning 
medical student inspired by a regionalist politician from the Aosta Valley to promote regional 
autonomy within Italy.73 After starting a newspaper first, by 1984 he had founded a political 
party. The Lega Lombarda received 0.46% of the vote in the 1985 Lombardy regional 
elections.74 This increased to 3.77% of the vote in Lombardy for the 1987 general elections, 
which was good for one seat in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.75 This was the 
Lega Lombarda’s position prior to joining the Alleanza Nord.  
 Piedmont is the large northwest region of Italy centered around the city of Turin. 
Piedmontese regionalism follows closely with Lombardy regionalism. Piedmontese regionalism 
started in 1955, with the familiar naming structure of early Padanian regionalism (though it was 
the first), through the founding of the Movimento per l'Autonomia Regionale Piemontese 
(Piedmontese Regional Autonomy Movement, 1955). This movement did the best in elections, 
relative to other early Padanian regionalism movements, becoming the fifth largest political force 
in the region in 1956.76 Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese joined the Movimento 
Autonomie Regionali Padane in 1958 but, like the other regionalists, was disappointed by the 
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results that that alliance yields. The Padanian movement dissolves quickly and the Piedmontese 
movement slowly, but both are gone by 1970 and the first regional elections in Piedmont.77 
There are sporadic appearances of Padanian regionalism through the 1970s including 
Piedmontese support for Guido Fanti’s Padanian proposal starting in 1975, but nothing of 
electoral significance.78 The next Piedmontese regionalism party, Union Piedmonteisa 
(Piedmontese Union, 1981) used association with other Padanian regionalism movements from 
the start. Its founder, Roberto Gremmo, was an editor for Lombard Bossi’s autonomist 
newspaper. Union Piedmonteisa took part in the 1983 general elections, winning 0.42% of the 
vote.79 This increased in the 1985 regional elections to 1.13%, though this was under the name of 
Liga Veneta, likely as a favor of convenience by Venetian regionalists to work around signature 
requirements and startup regulations of brand-new political parties.80 This was down to 0.9% in 
the 1987 general elections, yet general disagreements had fractured Union Piedmonteisa so that 
there was another Piedmontese regionalist party in Piedmont Autonomista (Autonomist 
Piedmont, 1987).81 Both parties were invited by Bossi to join the Alleanza Nord but, Gremmo 
did not want to partner with the splinter faction of his party nor was he in agreement with Bossi’s 
Lega Nord plans.82 Therefore only Piedmont Autonomista joined the alliance.  
 Liguria is the four coastal provinces south of Piedmont and on the northwestern Italian 
coast. The region’s principal city is Genoa and thus the region’s historical past is closely linked 
to the Most Serene Republic of Genoa. There appears to be no early Ligurian regionalist 
movement. This can be explained as a factor of Liguria’s geographic proximity to central Italy 
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(sharing a coast with Tuscany and Rome) and relative geographic periphery to Padania (the 
Apennines mountain range separating the region from the river Po heartland). Also, Liguria 
tends to be a political battleground on the left-right axis and so this likely occupied the time and 
space dedicated to politics within the region until regionalism entered the conversation from the 
surrounding outside. The first time Liguria is associated with Padanian regionalism is when it is 
included within Bossi’s and the other Padanian regionalist leaders’ definition of Padania. Liga 
Veneto did get 1.26% of the vote in the 1987 general election, so by then, there appears to be at 
least a little interest in Padanian regionalism.83 The first party to present a Ligurian-specific 
regionalist agenda was Uniun Ligure (Ligurian Union, 1987), inspired by the successful 
emergence of regionalists in the three regions covered so far. They are essentially immediately 
welcomed into the Alleanza Nord.84  
 The final region on this tour of pre-Padania is Emilia. Emilia is the larger northern half of 
the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna. The area’s primary city is Bologna. Bologna is known as a 
historical stronghold of the communists and socialists.85 The most important figure in Emilian 
regionalism is Guido Fanti. He became the first regional president of Emilia-Romagna in 1970, 
from the Communist Party, not a regionalist party, but he began regularly promoting the idea of a 
united Padania comprised of the five regions I have defined it as.86 Many sources and people 
credit him with popularizing the idea of Padania, though these sources tend to overlook the 
Movimento Autonomie Regionali Padane. However, it may be true that he was the first to 
include (and certainly the first to popularize the inclusion of) Liguria and Emilia into the 
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proposal of Padania, as before him, Padanian regionalism was only found in Piedmont, 
Lombardy, and Veneto. It should be noted that his idea of Padania was not independent from 
Italy, only a form of federalized cooperation. The first Emilian regionalist political party was 
formed by Lega Lombarda members (Lombardy and Emilia are closely linked through 
proximity) as Lega Emiliano-Romagnola (Emilian-Romagna League, 1989) as an opportunity to 
get votes from Emilians for the Alleanza Nord. It would not exist without the other Padanian 
regionalists as it is much closer to central Italy and the anti-Southern sentiments based on 
relative economic disparity do not tend to play as favorably to a socialist and communist crowd.  
 Before turning the lens of the viability theory on the Lega Nord, there are two points I 
would like to make. First, how is viability theory playing out following the ECSC and the EEC? 
The first inklings of Padanian nationalism (outside of Veneto) are organized following the 
creation of the common market (market benefit and public goods benefit) and the security 
guaranteed by NATO (security benefit). So that supports viability theory. However, these 
movements fail to take off, even regionally, and it is not until other regionalism movements 
successfully finish the campaign for regional powers that enables the first regional elections that 
the movements are revived. 
One way to view this is that regionalism has some sort of contagion effect, that 
movements with stronger substate identities campaign for the viability of their nation which in 
turn is compelling enough that other regions start to contemplate their own autonomy or 
independence. This could mean that viability theory only strengthens the arguments for 
regionalism but needs both the diffusion of the arguments and actors willing to promote the 
arguments. The second way to view this is that up until the Movimento Autonomie Regionali 
Padane, the regionalist movements were working and growing separately and that when they 
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combined their missions, in effect they created a restart of the regionalism movement. Too put it 
in other words, while there was growing popular support, fueled in part by European integration, 
for Lombardy nationalism, Venetian nationalism, and Piedmontese nationalism, there was none 
for Padania nationalism. Once Padanian nationalism became the cause, then it had to rebuild 
from nonexistence to a political electoral force. It seems this took about twenty-five to thirty 
years.  
Second, Lombardy nationalism, Venetian nationalism, Piedmontese nationalism, 
Ligurian nationalism, and Emilian nationalism still exist. They did largely disappear as their 
supporters refocused on Padanian nationalism, but it is relevant to remember that all of these 
movements have also had political parties and varying degrees of electoral success separate from 
the Padanian nationalism in the 21st century, and should Padania ever come to exist as a country 
(especially within the EU), it would likely be immediately confronted with the need to address 
these factions.   
 The Alleanza Nord might have occurred within the perfect window for its electoral 
success. The Single European Act of 1987 had recently passed as the first significant piece of 
viability theory triggering integration. With the new common foreign, environmental, safety, and 
security policies which served as both EU-provided public goods (public goods benefit) and a 
further guarantee of citizen’s security (security benefit), this act would be expected to encourage 
voters towards regionalism. Looking at the 1990 regional elections, though at this point all the 
Alleanza Nord member parties competed separately within their subregions but still with public 
association with each other, the results were an impressive uptick. The votes were 28.6% in 
Lombardy (up wildly from 0.46%), 5.9% in Veneto (up mildly from 3.7%), 5.1% in Piedmont 
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(up from 1.1%), 6.1% in Liguria (first time), and 2.9% in Emilia (first time).87 Seeing the success 
of this collaboration, Bossi formed the alliance into a single political party, the Lega Nord in 
1991.  
The new party was then immediately aided by the news of a large corruption scandal that 
shook the established major parties and lent credence to the Lega Nord’s message of a Padanian 
economic identity, casting the politicians in Rome as corrupt and stealing Padanian money. The 
Lega Nord took part in the 1992 Italian general elections and saw a similar improvement of 
results. The new voter support was good for 23% in Lombardy (up from 3.8%), 17.3% in Veneto 
(up from 3.1%), 16.3% in Piedmont (up from 0.9%), 14.2% in Liguria (up from 1.3%), 9.6% in 
Emilia (first time) and 8.65% for all of Italy.88 This got Lega Nord fifty-five seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies and made them the fourth biggest party in Italy.89 They repeated this feat 
(specifically 8.36% of all of Italy) in the snap elections of 1994 that were called after the major 
corruption scandal had led to electoral reform.90 The big difference is that, between the two 
years, Lega Nord had gone from refusing to work with any of the major parties due to the major 
parties being associated with corruption and Southern Italy governmental waste to being in a 
coalition alliance with the newly-formed party of Silvio Berlusconi that would win the new 
electoral system and thus see the Lega Nord enter government, hold power, and get 62 new seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies.91  
 This is a moment to pause and examine a bit closer what I think is one of the best 
examples of viability theory. Because of what has happened since this pair of elections, the Lega 
 
87 Massetti and Schakel, “Between Autonomy.” 
88 Massetti and Schakel, “Between Autonomy.”; Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, “Archivio 
storico.”  
89 Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, “Archivio storico.”  
90 For more on the details of the electoral reform, see the Sardinia section of this chapter, circa 1993. Italian vote 
percentage from Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, “Archivio storico.” 
91 Bulli and Tronconi, “The Lega Nord,” 56.; Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, “Archivio storico.”  
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Nord has a reputation as being a right-wing to far-right political party that capitalized on the 
wave of nationalism and nativism in Europe in the 21st century. This moment does not prove that 
reputation false, but it is important to point out that the wave had not yet started as we can look 
to the rise of Vlaams Belang in the Belgium section of Chapter 1 as coinciding with the far-right 
wave. The ideology of the party at the time is also relevant. Prominent leaders of Lega Nord 
including the face of the party, Umberto Bossi, were left-wing politicians on most issues. They 
were definitely anti-Southern Italian immigrants and thereby anti-immigration at large, but Lega 
Nord was truly an umbrella party on the left-right axis, and, as political scientists Giorgia Bulli 
and Filippo Tronconi point out, Lega Nord “was also able to attract voters from all the main 
parties, from the neofascist Movimento Sociale Italiano to Democrazia Cristiana, and from the 
parties of the left.”92 Their signature issue was federalism (especially fiscal federalism) on behalf 
of regionalism that could lead to separatism.93 This is why this is one of the best examples of 
viability theory because, with as purely regionalist a political message as possible, the vote is as 
detached from the left-right cycles of politics as possible, and the elections followed shortly after 
new European integration. And in the aftermath of this first major integration since 1958, 
regionalism came up big.  
The one quirk of Lega Nord is that is not in line with viability theory at this moment is 
that Lega Nord is still Eurosceptic, though mildly so because one of the biggest qualms the 
current Lega Nord has with the EU is the use of the Euro which has not even been approved 
yet.94 Its Euroscepticism in this time frame was simply the idea that Lega Nord was not fighting 
for sovereignty and the greater autonomy that comes with that just to give it up without receiving 
 
92 Bulli and Tronconi, “The Lega Nord,” 56.  
93 “Padania,” World Heritage Encyclopedia. 
94 Catherine Edwards, “Political cheat sheet: Understanding Italy’s Northern League,” The Local (Italy, Online), 
January 18, 2018,  https://www.thelocal.it/20180118/political-cheat-sheet-understanding-italys-northern-league/. 
Piel 62 
 
sufficient benefits. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 would introduce the Euro (market benefit), 
along with further cooperation on justice and home affairs (public goods benefit and security 
benefit) and the official creation of the European Union that would trigger viability mechanisms 
for the 1996 general elections. I consider these to be the second-best viability theory examples in 
the Padania case because they are only conflated with a new electoral system that favors large 
parties, and Lega Nord had just become a large party.  
 In 1993, Italy, along with the other countries of the EEC, signed the Maastricht Treaty 
and joined the newly created European Union. This is a big moment because it is a well-covered 
and symbolic moment of integration, but the new policy also contains integration that triggers 
several viability mechanisms.95 Looking at the 1996 Italian general election, the Padanian 
regionalists gain further ground. Lega Nord receives half a million more votes than just two 
years prior, good for 10.07% in all of Italy.96 On the regional level of that result is 29.3% in 
Veneto (up 11.5%), 25.5% in Lombardy (up 2.5%), 18.2% in Piedmont (up 1.9%), 10.2% in 
Liguria (down 4.1%) and 7.2 in Emilia (down 2.4%).97 This is an amazing success when one 
considers that the party was competing against both a center-right and a center-left coalition in a 
system designed for two-party competition.98 However, Lega Nord could not enter power 
because their exit of the 1994 center-right coalition caused the 1996 snap elections, and the 
emboldened party’s double down on separatism, including the symbolic gestures of a Padanian 
 
95 I go over the three core pillars of the EU and how they are viability mechanisms in the Flanders section of Chapter 
1.     
96 Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, “Archivio storico.” 
97 Ibid.; I use the 1992 election as the comparison for change, instead of the 1994 election because in both 1992 and 
1996, Lega Nord was running alone while in 1994 it was an electoral alliance partner.  
98 Bulli and Tronconi, “The Lega Nord,” 57. 
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declaration of independence in 1996, made it hard to find any common ground with the center-
left.99 So it spent the next five years in opposition at the national and regional level.100  
 The 2001 general Italian election was not a good result for Lega Nord. It managed to 
capture only 3.94% of the vote nationally.101 Is this a challenge to viability theory? On one hand, 
Lega Nord should be expected to grow or at least maintain its support. However, one narrative is 
that the five years in opposition had netted no tangible benefits for the Lega Nord voters from the 
Lega Nord and this caused their voters to sour on them.102 This could be true. My explanation is 
that the decrease is not only because of them being locked out (be it self-imposed) from the 
potential of governing, but when they decided to try to get back into positions of power, they 
took a step back from separatism. Lega Nord joined the center-right coalition with an agreement 
that government reforms would take place to give much greater autonomy to the regions and 
localities of Italy.103 The Lega Nord shifted to a more moderate regionalist stance and a 
referendum on Italian governmental reform was hashed out and implemented by the next 
elections.104  
This represents a step back from the earlier more intensely Padanian nationalist message. 
Also, as I argue in Chapter 1, the devolution of powers can serve as an antidote to regionalism, 
so the promised reforms may be muting the power of the regionalists’ message. Therefore, it 
makes sense that when the reform referendum fails after the 2006 general election, Lega Nord 
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102 Bulli and Tronconi, “The Lega Nord,” 58.  
103 Ibid.  




bounces back to its pre-compromise levels with 8.3% in the 2008 general election.105 The idea 
that the failure of promised devolution yields a return of support for Lega Nord is further 
supported by electoral increases in the Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Liguria, and Emilia (all of 
the Padanian core) regional elections of 2010.106  
At this point, the Treaty of Lisbon is signed in 2009 and further viability theory relevant 
integration is on the way, so Padanian regionalism should be primed to take off in the 2010s. 
However, it is rocked to its foundations, and then evolves instead. Umberto Bossi had been the 
public face of Lega Nord and the structural leader as Federal Secretary for nearly twenty-five 
years, but, in 2012 while the Lega Nord treasurer is being investigated for money laundering, 
fraud, and embezzlement, documents in the trial reveal that Bossi misappropriated party and 
taxpayer funds for personal uses.107 He is forced into retirement (he’ll come back but in a much 
more marginalized role), and the Federal Secretary position passes to moderate Roberto 
Maroni.108 This large corruption scandal hurts Lega Nord in the 2013 Italian election, as they get 
only 4.09% of the vote.109 However, in the concurrent Lombardy regional elections, Maroni 
becomes President of Lombardy as head of a center-right coalition in the region.110 To focus on 
this he leaves the Federal Secretary position and, after internally defeating a resurgent Bossi, 
Matteo Salvini is elected the new Federal Secretary. Salvini takes the Lega Nord to the far right, 
adopts an extremely Eurosceptic stance, and eventually, drops the Nord (North/Northern) from 
Lega Nord and with it the separatism and Padanian regionalism, positioning Lega as an Italian 
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nationalist and anti-immigrant (in the face of the European refugee crisis) party.111 He kicks out 
pro-EU members such as Flavio Tosi and is heavily criticized by Bossi for the shifts to the right 
in the party. His message is well received by the voters as Lega gets 17.35% of the 2018 general 
election vote.112 With this result, TIME Magazine called him the most feared man in Europe.113 
He is still running the party in the manner described above, as of the time of writing. 
What does this all mean for Padanian regionalism and viability theory? First, for 
Padanian regionalism, Lega has muddied the water. Padanian regionalism does not seem to be in 
Salvini’s plans, so there is little progress on the national scale. However, there are still many 
regionalists within Lega. An example of this is Luca Zaia. He is currently Lega’s President of 
Veneto and the most popular regionalist in Italy with his personal electoral list getting 44.6% of 
the 2020 regional vote alone, and Lega’s combined lists receiving a resounding 77% of the 
vote.114 His continued support bodes well for viability theory’s explanation of regionalism. 
 However, because of Salvini, I do not think the 2018 general electoral results fall within 
the scope of viability theory because Lega is frankly no longer a regionalist party when 
competing at the national level. If one wanted to attempt to observe viability theory in Padania in 
the past five years and going forward, one has to look at the prominent leaders of the regional 
branches of Lega and determine their position on the center-periphery cleavage. Even then, it 
would be difficult to filter out the increase in support that came from the right-wing shift versus 
viability theory, integration, and regionalism. Even Zaia is likely a beneficiary of both of these. 
The other option is to examine regionalist parties besides Lega (who, as I mentioned before, do 
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exist), but these are either regionalists of just Lombardy or Veneto or Piedmont, or Padanian 
regionalists who have not yet been able to take the title of Padanian regionalism away from Lega 
because of its history and remaining regionalist factions. These other options do not fit my 
study’s selection criteria having never achieved anything on the national level.  
All in all, the Padanian case study has shown how Padanian regionalism came into 
existence through an alliance of separate regionalists and politicians working to create a new 
uniting Padanian identity. The political parties of the Padanian regionalist alliance drew on the 
groundwork done by previous regionalists in the period following early European integration. 
Then Lega Nord offered several elections to best observe the viability theory by competing as a 
big-tent party ideologically and campaigning solely on regionalist issues in a time frame shortly 
following further viability-triggering integration. Finally, Lega has been co-opted, due to its 
populist origins, for right-wing populism and, as it stands now, is transitioning away from 
regionalism. This transition could be a signal that this is one of the ways that regionalist 
movements end.    
Looking to the future, the big question is what is Salvini going to do? He wants to reform 
the EU from the inside, and this could mean regression on integration.115 If he does this before 
his right-wing surge declines, it could spell difficulty for the future of Padanian regionalism. If 
he proves long-lasting, it will be interesting to see how little or how many changes the 
regionalists within Lega are able to extract from him or if they splinter off. Finally, if he leaves 
power before he accomplishes his goals, then it will be interesting to see if Lega returns to 
Padanian nationalism, be it federalism or separatism, and, if so, what does the party do then?  
 
 




Galicia and Catalonia 
The case studies for this chapter will be Galicia and Catalonia. Since both are in Spain, I 
start by explaining how European integration for Spain was a slightly different process than the 
other countries of this paper. I then start with Galicia, first by briefly examining the territory 
claimed by and the history of Galician nationalism, then by reviewing the Spanish national 
elections from the end of the Franco dictatorship until the present day. Like the other chapters, I 
will focus on major moments of EU integration and how the Galician regionalist parties fared 
afterwards. It is often important to consider Galician regionalism as being connected to the other 
regionalism movements within Spain, so at various points, I will highlight this connection. This 
leads nicely into Catalonia, which is one of the most prominent regionalism movements in Spain 
and in Europe. First, I start with the history of Catalan regionalism. Then, since post-Franco 
Catalan elections are mostly dominated by regionalist parties, I use this case study to examine 
the potential implications of viability theory in an all-regionalist sphere. By this, I mean that I 
continue the chronological order of the review of the previous case studies, but I will focus on 
European integration’s impacts on the Catalan regionalist parties that campaign for independence 
as opposed to the more moderate Catalan regionalists. I will end this section with a look to the 
future of the Catalonia independence movement.   
Moving from Italy to Spain is a small but noteworthy change in the contextual timeframe 
of this study because, while all of the previous regions were part of the European integration 
movement from the beginning, Spain only acceded to the EU in 1986, eleven years after the 
death of Francisco Franco and the end of his dictatorship. This means two things: first, that 
instead of the major integration steps or moments and their sometimes gradual and sometimes 
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immediate implementation that occurred over thirty years, Spain had to undergo this process in a 
much shorter time frame (though, to be fair, the amount of integration that Spain underwent was 
significantly more modest than that of Eastern European enlargement in 2004 or the most recent 
accession of Croatia in 2013). Considering Spanish integration into the EU through viability 
theory, the accession of Spain could be expected to yield a sharper increase in regionalist 
electoral support because more viability theory mechanisms were triggered, some to a higher 
degree. Conversely, regionalist movements had less time to construct party structures and both 
educate and convince the electorate on the viability of their region existing as an independent yet 
EU-integrated state. So, in one sense, Spain’s accession to an ongoing integration project gives 
regionalists a potentially stronger integration boost but leaves them potentially less prepared to 
utilize it. Second, since Franco allowed no elections in his 36 years in power, dramatically 
altered the Spanish political system, and actively suppressed regionalism movements, there is 
only a very small window of elections to use as a pre-integration data point, and these elections 
occur in an especially fragile democratic transition period. Keeping this in mind, let us now turn 
to the regionalism movements themselves.  
Galicia  
Portugal owns most of the west coast of the Iberian Peninsula and, aside from a less-
extended bit owned by Spain’s Andalusia region near the mouth of the Mediterranean, the rest of 
the western Iberian coast makes up Galicia. Therefore, besides being bordered by the Atlantic to 
the west, Galicia is bordered by the Cantabrian Sea to the north and Portugal to the south. Its 
eastern border with the rest of Spain roughly corresponds to a vertical extension of the 
Portuguese-Spanish border, with mountains along this border offering it some geographic 
isolation. The capital of the region is Santiago de Compostela while the largest and economically 
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most important city is the port city of Vigo. However, Galicia is economically less prosperous 
than much of Spain and relatively rural.1 Historically, the region was a Celtic kingdom 
conquered by the Romans, before operating independently for centuries until its absorption by 
the Spanish precursor kingdom of Castile and Aragon.2 There exists a unique Galician language, 
most similar to Portuguese, that is spoken by 90% of the population in Galicia.3  
Historically, there is a strong record of support for Galician nationalism. In 1936, there 
was a referendum to pursue a statute of autonomy as then allowed by the Spanish constitution. It 
passed with 73.96% of eligible Galician voters supporting it and only 0.45% opposing (the rest 
did not vote).4 However, the outbreak of the Spanish civil war meant that the statute was never 
reviewed at the national level, never came into effect, and ultimately, was no longer an option 
under the Franco regime.5 It was symbolically confirmed by the Parliament in exile in 1938.6  
However, as Franco worked to create a unitary state under his absolute power, he suppressed any 
institutions of Galician nationalism (i.e. political parties or newspapers) and, while logistically 
unable to be fully implemented, the Galician language was also suppressed. This meant the 
Galician regionalism functioned underground as a form of resistance, and even to consider 
oneself a member of the Galician nation was a small, subtle rejection of Franco.  
 
1 “The Galicians,” U.S. Library of Congress, accessed March 20, 2021, http://countrystudies.us/spain/38.htm.  
2 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Galicia,” accessed March 20, 2021, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Galicia-region-Spain. 
3 Though, in most cases, not the only language spoken by the population.; Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. 
“Galician language,” accessed March 20, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Galician-language.  
4 “Galizien (Spanien), 4. Juli 1936: Autonomiestatut,” Database and Search Engine for Direct Democracy, last 
modified January 24, 2019, https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=es011936.  
5 It is a fun little historical irony that Galician autonomy is stopped by one of its own- Francisco Franco was born in 
Galicia in the city of Ferrol. Considering this and Napoleon’s origin on the island of Corsica, there is at least an 
eyebrow raise at the possibility of geographically and economically isolated areas with a strong regional identity 
producing authoritarian centralizing leaders capable of constructing a more powerful and encompassing national 
identity.   
6 F. J. Schrijver, “Regionalism and Galicianisation in autonomous Galicia,” in Regionalism After Regionalisation: 
Spain, France, and the United Kingdom, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 122. 
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The legacy of Franco’s suppression further meant that for the first election in democratic 
Spain in 1977, Galician regionalism only had small resistance-based political structures that 
coalesce into the Bloque Nacional-Popular Galego (Galician National-Popular Bloc, 1977). This 
party is a coalition party of groups from the extreme left to the center, but, importantly, 
advocating primarily for the restoration of sovereignty to Galicia. The more militant and more 
radical leftist (two separate but not immiscible groups) refused to join the party and continued 
their struggle elsewhere.7 Bloque Nacional Popular Gallego got 2.02% in Galicia of the 1977 
Spanish constitutional election vote.8 This is not a particularly good result compared to having 
had decades to operate freely prior to the dictatorship, and it left the Galician regionalists with no 
representation in the constitution creation process. However, through the demands of Catalan and 
Basque regionalists, Galician regionalists would benefit from having passed that Statute of 
Autonomy in 1936 because all these similar statutes’ regions are recognized as historic 
nationalities in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. This gave Galicia pre-autonomous status and 
kicked off a bizarre campaign for a second Statute of Autonomy.  
At first, the Spanish central government wanted to give Galicia the minimal amount of 
autonomy it could get away with, fearing that since Galician nationalists were not as politically 
engaged as the Basque or Catalans, other less politically engaged regions would desire Galicia’s 
outcome. This made almost every political party angry (as in taking to the streets to protest) in 
Galicia, so the central government backtracked and allowed Galicians a referendum for an 
autonomy on par with the other historic nationalities.9 What is humorous about this is that the 
 
7 Schrijver, “Regionalism and Galicianisation,” 124. 
8 A smaller Galician regionalist party, Partido Democrata Gallego, also received 0.28% of the Galician vote.; 
“Consulta de Resultados Electorales,” Ministerio del Interior, 
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/infoelectoral/min/busquedaAvanzadaAction.html.  
9 Specifically, Catalonia.; Schrijver, “Regionalism and Galicianisation,” 125. 
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central government created the pushback against itself because there was not widespread support 
for the level of autonomy given to the Basque and Catalan until the people of Galicia perceived 
themselves as being treated unequally to those other recognized groups. Even more so, the 
Bloque Nacional Popular Gallego was one of the few groups that did not protest the 
government’s unfairness, as their message was one of independence, and so they rejected any 
form of autonomy within Spain. This is somewhat similar to the 2003 Corsica referendum where 
the Corsican nationalists that wanted independence encouraged their supporters to vote against 
more autonomy.  Therefore, the Galician regionalists ended up campaigning against regional 
autonomy in the referendum and the Spanish state-wide parties campaigning for it. The 
regionalists lost and the statute passed in 1981.10   
Galician regionalist parties would not get any elected representation in the 1979 or 1982 
Spanish general elections. There is a small change to note in this period in that, similarly to 
Flanders in Chapter 1, nationwide parties start to operate a Galician-specific branch. For 
example, the Partido Socialista de Galicia -PSOE (Galician Socialist Party – abbreviation of the 
national socialist party) did well (almost 33% in Galicia) in the 1982 election.11 On January 1st, 
1986, Spain joined the European Community (EC), which means it entered into both the ECSC 
and the EEC.12 This would have triggered all four viability mechanisms at once (public goods 
benefit, market benefit, structural funds benefit, and security benefit). As viability theory 
projects, Galician regionalists should see a boost in the June 1986 Spanish general election, and 
 
10 For a greater breakdown on the political alignments of this referendum see: Schrijver, “Regionalism and 
Galicianisation,” 125-126. 
11 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”  
12 “Spain and the European Community,” U.S. Library of Congress, accessed March 20, 2021, 
http://countrystudies.us/spain/38.htm.; To briefly go over the structure of the European Community (EC), it is just a 
larger grouping of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (which I believe to be marginally irrelevant to the purpose of this 
study and therefore is never mentioned aside from here).   
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they did. The moderate centrist Coalicion Galega (Galician Coalition, 1983) received 6.24% of 
the vote in Galicia, for which they received one, and therefore the first Galician regionalist, 
deputy in the Spanish Congress.13 I think it is important to point out that the party from Galicia 
that most quickly capitalized on European integration was the one with the platform most 
focused on the regionalist and nationalist position on the center-periphery cleavage. This 
supports viability theory even more because, while no party can be completely free of a left-right 
ideological position, Coalicion Galega’s success cannot be attributed to any left or right trends at 
the time.  
Bloque Nacional Popular Gallego renamed itself as the more eloquent Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist Bloc, 1982)  and received a further 2.11% of the 1986 
vote in Galicia.14 This is a total regionalist vote share of around 9%, which only increases to 
about 10% in the 1989 Spanish general elections.15 However, Galician nationalists lose their 
deputy seat as Coalicion Galega and Bloque Nacionalista Galego split the vote more evenly and 
therefore neither (nor the smaller regionalist parties) met the threshold. In the June 1993 Spanish 
general elections, right before the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of 
the European Union, the Galician regionalist total vote percentage increased slightly to 13%; 
however, Coalicion Galega had fractured (and was on its way to complete collapse), so Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego jumped up to 8.01% of the Galician vote but that was still not enough for 
national representation.16  
In November 1993, the European Union came into existence through the Maastricht 
Treaty. This continued all existing integration and further solidified the guaranteeing security 
 
13 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”  
14 Ibid.; A further 1.14% went to a united Galician left party. 
15 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.” 
16 Ibid.  
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mechanism through a common foreign and security policy (security benefit), as well as providing 
bloc-wide public goods through common cooperation in the areas of justice and home affairs 
(public goods benefit). The creation of the Euro, a common currency (market benefit), was 
started as well, though that would take nearly a decade to implement. But besides this delay, the 
other forms of integration happened quickly.  
Bloque Nacionalista Galego became the premier Galician nationalist party and made an 
ideological transition that stands as a strong piece of evidence for viability theory. Prior to the 
1996 Spanish general elections, Bloque Nacionalista Galego was a Eurosceptic party, though 
this was based on economic consideration since the leftist part of Bloque Nacionalista Galego 
was concerned that joining the EEC would be joining a capitalist system that would further hurt 
Galician society.17 This is a different anti-Europe position than the right-wing anti-immigrant 
and pro-state (sometimes region) sovereignty typical of Eurosceptic parties. However, the 
Bloque Nacionalista Galego started to seriously promote the idea of Galicia existing as a nation 
within the EU and thus adopted a favorable stance towards Europe. Political geographer Frans 
Schrijver clarifies this point through reviewing (and translating) the Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego’s official programs.  
In the 1990s, the perspective on the European Union shifted towards a level of 
governance ‘affecting the competencies for national self-government and the interests’ of 
Galicia, in which Galicia would be represented by ‘its own voice’ (Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego, 1999). In the BNG’s discourse, ‘Europe’ has become a framework for the 
recognition of the status of Galicia as a nation, next to that of the ‘plurinational state’. In 
line with transformations of other regionalist parties, when expressed through the idea of 
 
17The party was also transitioning to a more centrist position, which helps explain the willingness to devalue these 
economic considerations.; Schrijver, “Regionalism and Galicianisation, 155. 
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a ‘Europe of the regions’ or of the ‘peoples’, ‘Europe’ became an instrument to attack the 
existing state level. Those institutional opportunities out-weighed economic threats.18 
This shows that the Bloque Nacionalista Galego both conformed to the pro-EU position 
expected by the viability theory and was implicitly using the logic of viability theory in their 
official stance on the EU. By implicitly using the logic, I mean that the Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego recognized that its arguments for Galician nationhood were strengthened if the Galician 
nation existed within the EU. Furthermore, the plurinational state that Schrijver is describing as 
the ideal Spain for Bloque Nacionalista Galego, comprised of four nations integrated into a 
multi-nation bloc, and thus, the ideal Spain for Galician regionalists in the 1990s, is essentially a 
smaller-in-scope European Union.  
 Now viability theory would project that a pro-EU regionalist party would see significant 
vote increases in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and that is exactly what happens. In the 1996 
Spanish general election, Bloque Nacionalista Galego received 12.85% of the vote in Galicia 
and this was good for its first two elected deputies.19 These deputies were in opposition through 
the next election. In the Spanish general election of 2000, Bloque Nacionalista Galego saw an 
even bigger gain, increasing its vote share to 18.62%, which netted the party an additional 
deputy, bringing their total to three.20 The party stayed in opposition. However, this ideological 
shift and the accompanying vote increase is a strong piece of evidence in favor of viability 
theory. 
It is important to note here that the Spanish electoral system functions as a two-party 
system, though with the potential for smaller parties. These two major parties are the Popular 
 
18 Schrijver, “Regionalism and Galicianisation, 154-155. 




Party (center-right) and the Socialist Party (center-left).21 In Galicia, because of the early 
strength of the regionalism movement, these parties are named the Popular Party of Galicia and 
the Socialist Party of Galicia. Neither seems to advance a strong regionalist position. Now, in the 
1997 Galician regional elections, Bloque Nacionalista Galego becomes the second-largest party, 
overtaking the Socialists.22 This dramatically changes the objectives of the Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego. Before, they were advocating for Galician regionalism with little hope of ever 
governing, instead their mission was publicizing their Galician message and fighting to protect 
the region’s language, autonomous powers, and culture. This is considered a policy seeking 
orientation.23  
After becoming the second-largest party, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego shifts to an 
office-seeking orientation in hopes of governing, be it solely or as part of a coalition.24 For this 
reason, in an effort to appeal more broadly, Bloque Nacionalista Galego backed away from its 
regionalist message in favor of remaining in a Spanish state albeit one with institutional 
recognition of the Galician nation.25 Bloque Nacionalista Galego become only moderate 
regionalists. This position is backing away from the state-size calculating that make viability 
theory’s arguments compelling. When a regionalist party moves away from seeking more powers 
for its region (and this is different than accepting a compromise for the time being without 
changing the end goal of more autonomy or independence), viability theory will offer less 
support for the regionalists because those buying into a more viable independence or greatly 
autonomous end goal no longer have that to buy in to.  Therefore, while a moderate regionalist 
 
21 Here Popular means of or relating to the will of the people and of the general public.   
22 Margarita Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, “The Bloque Nacionalista Galego,” in From Protest to Power: Autonomist 
Parties and the Challenges of Representation, ed. by Elias Anwen and Filippo Tronconi (Wien: Braumüller, 2011), 
126.  
23 Ibid., 142. 
24 Ibid., 142. 
25 Ibid., 143. 
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party should expect a moderate boost from European integration, an independentist party that 
shifts to moderate regionalism should expect a decrease in the boost it had previously received. 
And that is what happens here.  
 Because of the veer away from a Galician regionalist message, Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego suffers a moderate decline in the 2004 Spanish general election to 11.37% of the vote 
and back to two seats.26 However, in 2005, Bloque Nacionalista Galego enters government for 
the first time, forming the Galician regional government in coalition with the Socialist Party. 
This is despite a series of moderate declines in regional vote share since changing to an office- 
seeking orientation (25.1% in 1997 to 18.9% in 2005).27 This Galician coalition government 
agrees to seek to reform the Galician Statute of Autonomy with the purpose of gaining more 
autonomy for Galicia. The Bloque Nacionalista Galego takes an extremely moderate regionalist 
and nationalist position in this reform negotiation process. Political scientist Margarita Gómez-
Reino Cachafeiro describes the Bloque Nacionalista Galego in this process as  
The BNG quickly displayed a willingness to compromise on its territorial demands, for 
example by not insisting on the recognition of the ‘national character’ of Galicia in the 
reformed text. Throughout the negotiations, the BNG continued to assert that none of its 
positions were fixed and nonnegotiable.28   
Despite this willingness to hold a position only weakly, reform discussion fails and thus never 
happens. While the negotiation is still underway for the 2008 Spanish general election, which 
yields Bloque Nacionalista Galego a stagnant 11.5% of the vote in Galicia, by the 2009 regional 
elections, Bloque Nacionalista Galego is seen as having failed to deliver on its regionalist 
 
26 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.” 
27 Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, “The Bloque Nacionalista Galego,” 126. 
28 Ibid., 143.  
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promises and its vote share declines again.29 This causes the Bloque Nacionalista Galego to 
leave government. Under the lens of viability theory, while the increased integration did not 
continue to yield electoral improvement, the electoral decline is easily explained as a result of the 
shift away from a regionalist position. This is a first, with regards to the case studies of this 
research, as some parties have been willing to compromise for more autonomy on the path 
toward a strongly regionalist endpoint, but none have been willing to move that endpoint as far 
away from independence, nationhood, or sovereignty (and still consider themselves or fall within 
the realms of being a regionalist party) as the Bloque Nacionalista Galego in the 2000s.   
 The most recent round of European integration occurred in 2009 through the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The viability theory mechanism trigger in this round of integration was the strengthening 
of the position of the EU to negotiate trade deals on behalf of the bloc (market benefit). The 
following table shows Galician regionalism electoral results in the Spanish general elections 
since this round of integration:  
Table 4:   
Year Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego  




2011 11.18%  N/A N/A 2 
2015  4.32% - as part of Nós 25.01% - as part of En Marea + 18.15% 6 
2016 2.89% with Nós  22.18% - as part of En Marea - 4.26 5 
2019 5.74%  14.46% - as part of Galicia en Común - 4.87 2 
2019  8.09% 12.65% - as part of Galicia en Común + 1. 35 3 
Data from Ministerio del Interior.  
 
29 Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, “The Bloque Nacionalista Galego,” 144. 
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As one can see, Bloque Nacionalista Galego is able to hold that 11% mark through 
another Spanish election since 2004, but this is seen as a lack of progress, and, coupled with the 
decline at the regional level, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego starts to crumble internally. In 
2012, former founder and longtime prominent figure of the Galician independence movement 
Xosé Manuel Beiras leaves his Bloque Nacionalista Galego party and forms a new party, Anova 
(Renewal, 2012).30 This party declares itself in favor of Galician independence, presenting a 
new, stronger Galician regionalist option.31 The left-wing groups of Bloque Nacionalista Galego 
leave in the split as well, as they were unhappy with the party’s shift to the center.32 This split 
ultimately destroys what had been a relatively unified Galician regionalist front.  
 By the 2015 elections, both Bloque Nacionalista Galego and Anova are in talks for the 
creation of a single Galician regionalist political party.33 Anova joins with several grassroots 
Galician leftist movements known as ‘the tides,’ as well as the United Galician Left and the 
regional branch of a new nationwide anti-corruption left-wing populist party called Podemos. 
They call their electoral alliance En Marea (In Tide, 2015). This alliance performs very well in 
2015 and the follow-up elections of 2016.34  Then En Marea transitions to a political party run 
by previously independent judge Luís Villares (amid accusations of corruption) and essentially 
all the alliance members are unhappy with this, so they leave En Marea and reform their alliance 
 
30 The full name of the party is Anova-Irmandade Nacionalista which means Renewal-Nationalist Brotherhood.; 
Dick Nichols, “Galicia: Anova’s bruising congress a ‘collective apprenticeship,’” LINKS International Journal of 
Socialist Renewal, July 7, 2013, http://links.org.au/node/3431.   
31 World Heritage Encyclopedia, s.v. “Bloque Nacionalista Galego,” accessed March 21, 2021,  
http://www.self.gutenberg.org/articles/Bloque_Nacionalista_Galego.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Sara Torreiro, “Dos asambleas buscan los pilares para la confluencia en Galicia,” elDiario.es (Spain, Online), 
August 23, 2015, https://www.eldiario.es/galicia/asambleas-buscan-pilares-confluencia-galicia_1_2513388.html.  
34 The 2016 Spanish general elections were called as a result of the failure to form a government on the national 
level following the 2015 elections. 
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as Galicia en Común (Galician in Common, 2019).35 It appears this disorder and scandal hurts 
their electoral performance. Meanwhile, Bloque Nacionalista Galego refuses to ally with the 
Podemos party, as it is not a Galician nationalist party, and is able to attract a few other Galician 
regionalist groups to their Galician electoral alliance of Nós (We, 2015, later as BNG-Nós). This 
alliance yields mediocre results, in fact leaving the Bloque Nacionalista Galego without a 
national deputy for the first time in 20 years, and so the Bloque Nacionalista Galego decides to 
continue on alone.36 It appears that in light of the success of Anova and its partners, Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego has retaken, and thus decided to compete against Anova on, a stronger 
Galician nationalist stance and a more left-leaning platform.37 
 What does this all mean for evaluating viability theory in Galicia since the Treaty of 
Lisbon? I think the answer is that this time period of this case study is inconclusive. In 2011, the 
main Galician regionalist party is in a state of decline, yet they do not perform worse on the 
national level, so it is possible that the expected effects of viability theory are keeping the 
movement afloat. Then, there is a massive boom in total vote percentage for Galician regionalists 
in the 2015 election (and the follow-up 2016 election) which would be helpful for advancing the 
believability of viability theory, if it were not for the fact that most of that increase came from En 
Marea. En Marea was competing on much more than Galician regionalism (such as the Podemos 
message and left-wing populism), so it would be incorrect to consider that a Galician regionalist 
victory only.  Additionally, Podemos is a soft Eurosceptic party which means that some of the 
 
35 Cristina Huete, “Podemos plantea al sector crítico la ruptura de En Marea,” El Pais, January 8, 2019, 
https://elpais.com/ccaa/2019/01/08/galicia/1546972699_904730.html.  
36 Redacción, “El BNG se queda fuera del Congreso por vez primera en 20 años,” La Voz de Galicia (A Coruña), 
December 21, 2015, https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/elecciones2016/2015/12/20/bng-queda-fuera-congreso-
vez-primera-20-anos/00031450639144653630940.htm. 
37 Bloque Nacionalista Galego, En Bloque cara a un tempo novo., XVI Asemblea Nacional BNG. (A Coruña: 2017), 
https://nube.bng.gal/owncloud/index.php/s/H6lnOwma8tw6qMu.   
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votes for En Marea are actually votes against the arguments of viability theory.38 Finally, it is 
extremely difficult to explain if the electoral alliance of Galicia En Común’s electoral 
performance decrease, despite being comprised of the same founding parties of En Marea, is 
because of a challenge to viability theory or a challenge to a different part of the alliance’s 
positions. Therefore, my conclusion of inconclusiveness is based on the murkiness of both the 
reasons for the coalition’s rise and the coalition’s fall, which at both times were in part Galician 
regionalist parties. The fact that the Bloque Nacionalista Galego has slowly been shifting 
towards the periphery again and regaining the votes it lost to the left-wing populism does hint 
that viability theory may find further evidence in the Galician case in the future.  
 With the future in mind, Galician regionalism is likely going to benefit from sharing the 
Spanish state with regions that are more combative with more urgency on regionalist and 
separatist issues. Pathways to independence or more sovereignty will be likely be opened up for 
them by these other regions. It is also hurt by the fact that there is a lack of center-right Galician 
regionalist parties, thereby leaving left-wing policies highly linked to a future Galicia and thus 
hurting the Galician regionalist message’s broader appeal. Therefore, I think it is worth noting 
that in the 2020 Galician regional election, Galicia En Común lost all of its seats but the Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego reemerged as the second biggest political party in Galicia.39 This could 
mean that the turbulence of the 2010s is settling and that total support for Galician regionalism 
really did increase in that period. This could lead to further support and a second chance for the 
Bloque Nacionalista Galego. Finally, as the national two-party system in Spain seems to be 
 
38 Leandro Gago, “Is Podemos a Eurosceptic party?,” EuVisions, September 10, 2017, 
http://www.euvisions.eu/archive/is-podemos-a-eurosceptic-party/.  
39 With a healthy 23.79% of the vote for Bloque Nacionalista Galego (“Junta Electoral De Galicia,” Diario Oficial 
de Galicia, last modified July 29, 2020, 
http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/documentos/GALICIA_2020J_Resultados.pdf.).   
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ending, and coalition governments might become the new norm,40 there could be quite a few 
opportunities for a united Galician nationalist movement to compromise on left-right issues in 
exchange for advancements in their center-periphery pursuits.   
Catalonia  
Catalonia is home to undoubtedly one of the most well-known regionalist movements in 
the world today. Centered around the Catalan capital of Barcelona, Catalonia is comprised of 
four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona) in northeast Spain. It is among the 
wealthiest most industrialized parts of Spain, and Barcelona is an important economic hub and 
port in Europe.41 Catalonia has its own language, Catalan. Catalan is spoken in a wider area than 
just Catalonia, including the other Spanish regions of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, 
Northern Catalonia in France, and the independent country of Andorra (Catalan is Andorra’s 
only official language).42 Occasionally, there are calls for a greater Catalan unification within 
Catalan nationalism which includes these areas to various degrees. However, for the purpose of 
this case study, I will be using the results for only the Spanish autonomous community of 
Catalonia as Catalan regionalist parties typically only compete there. This is not to say there are 
no pan-Catalanists in these other regions, but there are strong unique regionalist movements (i.e., 
Valencian regionalism or Balearic regionalism) that differentiate them from the Catalonia case.43  
Historically, Catalonia was part of the kingdom of Aragon, prior to its merger with 
Castile that provides the origin of the united Spanish state.44 Going even farther back, Catalonia 
 
40 Such as the current coalition government which is the first one since the end of Franco’s dictatorship (Sam Jones, 
“Socialists and Podemos to rule together in Spanish coalition,” The Guardian, January 7, 2020,  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/07/pedro-sanchez-spain-pm-government-vote-parliament.). 
41 “Catalonia region profile,” BBC News, June 11, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20345071.  
42 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Catalan language,” accessed March 27, 2021, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Catalan-language.  
43 Obviously, there is no Andorra regionalism in Andorra as it is already its own country.  




spent significantly less time as part of the Islamic Al-Andalus, after being conquered and 
incorporated in the Frankish empire of Charlemagne.45 This gives Catalonia strong historical 
links with its east as opposed to its current unification with its west. Catalonia also spent 
centuries as both a nominal and formally independent kingdom before being incorporated into 
Aragon through marriage.46 Ultimately, there is a strong historical legacy and a distinct language 
and culture that forms the Catalan identity and its associated territory.  
Modern Catalan regionalism existed prior to the Franco dictatorship. When Spain 
transitioned from a monarchy to the Second Spanish Republic, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia, 1931) scored a major victory in municipal elections 
and declared the region as an independent Catalan state within a greater Iberian (Spanish) 
federation.47 Representatives for the new Spanish republican government had to come from 
Madrid and negotiate with the Esquerra Reblicana de Catalunya, and these negotiations led to 
Catalonia remaining part of Spain, but they were allowed to form their own regional government 
(called the Generalitat) and given significant autonomy and powers.48 This agreement was 
formalized in the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia in 1932. Since 99% of those who voted in 
the referendum on whether or not to support the statute (which was more of a poll to show a 
mandate than anything else) supported it, this shows that regionalism held significant sway in 
Catalonia way prior to integration. However, Catalonia would be one of the regions that fought 
most strongly against Franco in the Spanish civil war and was rewarded for this with a harsh 
 
45 Fodors.com, “Past & Present,” The New York Times Archive, 2002, 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/fodors/fdrs_feat_23_2.html?module=inline.   
46 Ibid.   
47 “The contemporary Government of Catalonia,” gencat, last modified November 19, 2018, 
https://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/historia/generalitat-contemporania/.   
48 Ibid.  
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crackdown on the Catalan language and culture after Franco’s victory.49 Therefore, Catalan 
regionalism had to emerge again following Franco’s death.  
Franco died in 1975. Constitutional assembly elections in Spain were in 1977. Shortly 
after these elections, the Catalonian Generalitat, which had been in exile since the Spanish civil 
war, was invited and returned to Spain.50 The Generalitat, with little formal power, formed a 
unity government to prepare another Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia that was approved in 
1979 and led to the first Generalitat elections in 1980. In a show of the strength of Catalan 
regionalism, every party in Catalonia to receive elected deputies in the 1979 general Spanish 
election was, at a minimum, a regionalized branch of a national party and of course, some unique 
Catalan regionalists.51 This means that, at a minimum, all parties believed in, to some degree, 
Catalan autonomy and Catalan nationalism. I think this makes sense that, after having the 
Catalan language and culture oppressed for decades, there is pushback and a high degree of 
support for the repromotion of Catalan nationalism, and through this support, the region is 
relatively successful at getting itself recognition and autonomous powers. As for why Galicia 
(from the first section of this chapter) did not see quite the same resurgence, it is likely that this 
is because the Galician language and culture were significantly less repressed by Franco. The 
reasons for Franco favoring Galicia are that Galicia is more isolated from the rest of Spain and 
less important to the national economy than Catalonia, while, most importantly as mentioned 
above, Catalonia was one of the strongholds of resistance against Franco in the Spanish Civil 
 
49 Kate Keller, “Beyond the Headlines, Catalan Culture Has a Long History of Vibrancy and Staying Power,” 
Smithsonian Magazine, June 25, 2018, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/beyond-headlines-
catalan-culture-has-long-history-vibrancy-and-staying-power-180969294/. 
50 gencat, “Government of Catalonia.” 
51 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”  
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War, while most of Galicia was conquered early on and remained relatively easy for Franco to 
control.     
The state of Catalan politics after the 1979 general election, however, presents some 
difficulties for viability theory. Viability theory asserts that regionalist political parties will do 
better as their region is rendered more viable as part of an integrated supranational organization. 
However, it is hard for Catalan regionalists and Catalan nationalists to do better than they did in 
1979, though they do lose some ground to the conservative Francoist Popular Alliance party in 
1982.52 However, to properly analyze viability theory in Catalonia, it is not sufficient to look 
only for Catalan regionalism because it is so widespread and from this initial data point, any and 
all success of a national-level party is going to appear as a decrease in Catalan regionalism. 
Instead, I will be looking for the results of parties taking the viability argument forward and 
seeking to promote Catalan separatism and/or Catalan independentism. This is because, while all 
regionalist parties are expected to become more viable, once the system is all regionalist parties, 
independence parties now represent those most theoretically strengthened by integration. This is 
also an opportunity to evaluate if the expected voter thinking that underpins viability theory is 
that of ‘well my state (national-level) government does less for me so it is more important or 
more useful for me to vote for the regionalists and their platform that better corresponds to our 
regional level needs’ or ‘I am believing that my region could exist better as an independent state 
in an integrated bloc.’ Since typically both are working together, this is only an important 
differentiation in an all, or mostly, regionalist sphere. I believe the second line of thinking I 
presented above is the stronger form of the viability argument, so that is the link between 
 
52 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”  
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viability theory and separatism. This framework is also consistent with how the modern 
regionalism debate in Catalonia is often framed in terms of unionists versus separatists. 
    Starting with the Spanish general elections of June 1986 as the first elections since 
Spain joined the European Community (EC) earlier that year (all four benefits), Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya is the most voted party to not get a deputy with 2.67%. However, they 
are important to mention because they were a historical catch-all for Catalan regionalism and, 
after spending the first decade of restored Spanish democracy trying to find a unique identity in 
the face of the wave of Catalan regionalism, Jamie Lluch points out that Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya decides to capitalize on various grassroots pro-independence movements and adopt 
a harder Catalan separatist stance in 1986.53 I point out that this shift occurred in lockstep with 
Spain joining the EC. In fact, now one of the three core values of Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya is independence, specifically “the creation of an independent state for the Catalan 
nation as part of Europe.”54 
Another important party to highlight is Convergència I Unió (Convergence and Union, 
1978). A strongly pro-European Catalan regionalist party that is an alliance between a liberal 
centrist ‘Convergence’ party and a Christian democrat ‘Union’ party (as in the official name for 
each party when translated from Catalan is Democratic _________ of Catalonia).55 
Convergència I Unió is strongly supportive of Catalan nationalism, but at this moment in time, 
the party is not in favor of independence, only for exploring options for greater autonomy for 
 
53 Jaime Lluch, Visions of Sovereignty: Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 57-58.; It does appear this was after the June elections of 
that year.  
54 “Esquerra’s Main Ideological Foundations – Independence,” Esquerra Republicana, last modified February 21, 
2019, https://en.esquerra.cat/en/esquerra-republicana-ideology-ideological-foundations#364.  




Catalonia within Spain.56 They receive 32% of the 1986 vote.57 The Socialist Party of Catalonia 
takes the plurality in the election but are only moderately Catalan regionalists, and the rest of the 
significant vote-getters are other moderate Catalan regionalists or national parties.  
In 1989, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is still finishing up its rebrand towards 
independentism (which is in and of itself significant), and Convergència I Unió is happy to 
maintain a status quo, which sees them as the primary, and in-power, party at the regional 
Generalitat level, so electoral results hold almost perfectly consistent in 1989 Spanish general 
election.58 The highlighted Catalan regionalist parties are highly supportive of European 
integration (especially the idea of a Europe of peoples) and likely welcome the coming 
Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the EU in 1993.  
The Maastricht Treaty created the European Union and therefore represents the biggest 
moment of European integration for Spain since it joined the EC. It also triggered several 
viability mechanisms such as providing bloc-wide public goods in the form of common domestic 
policies (public goods benefit) and a common foreign and security policy that both provided 
greater international leverage (market benefit) and guaranteed greater security for all member 
states (security benefit). For a further breakdown of the new pillars of the EU and how they 
triggered viability theory, that can be found in the Flanders section of Chapter 1. Therefore, what 
one would expect to see after this increase of integration would be better results for the Catalan 
separatists.  
The Spanish general elections of 1993 are a success for Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya. They receive 5.1% of the vote which allows them to have one deputy in the national 
 
56 Glen M. E. Duerr, Secessionism and the European Union: the Future of Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017), 102. 
57 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”  
58 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”; Lluch, Visions of Sovereignty, 58.   
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Congress of Deputies.59 It appears that in the face of integration, the independence message 
brought a vote increase. However, the increase does not continue in 1996, where Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya drops to 4.1%, yet they are still able to maintain one deputy.60 This 
small decrease results in party reorganization, yet the party leadership and message remain pro-
independence.61 The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya recovers to 5.64% of the vote in the 
2000 Spanish general election.62 Up to this point, the independence corollary of viability theory 
seems to only have provided a small and non-increasing boost to the Catalan independentists.  
However, after a further increase at the regional level to 16.4 % in 2003,63 saw the 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya make a somewhat surprising move to transition the Catalan 
nationalists Convergència I Unió party out of power after two decades.64 This is for two reasons: 
first, Convergència I Unió had slightly tarnished its centrist positionality by cooperating with the 
center-right Popular Party, and the new Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya coalition was united 
on the left of center economically. Furthermore, the partners of the Catalonian Socialist party and 
the Catalonian Greens, while lightly Catalan regionalist and therefore far more unionist than the 
Esquerra Republican de Catalunya, agreed to undertake a reform of the Statute of Autonomy 
with the intention of creating more autonomy and recognitions for Catalonia.65 Interestingly, this 
is something Convergència I Unió had been unable or unwilling to do. Though a compromise, 
the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya cast this reform as an important step on the path to 
 
59 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.” 
60 Ibid.  
61 Jordi Argelaguet, “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya,” in From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the 
Challenges of Representation, ed. by Elias Anwen and Filippo Tronconi (Wien: Braumüller, 2011), 159.  
62 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”  
63 This increase is not a drastic as it might appear because Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya was operating in the 
high single digits in terms of vote share percentage at the regional level throughout the 1990s, which is quite a bit 
higher than their Spanish general election results that have been reviewed thus far.   
64 Argelaguet, “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya,” 153, 164.  
65 Ibid., 164.  
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independence and was rewarded for their initiative with 15.89% of the vote in the 2004 Spanish 
general election.66  
The revised Statute of Autonomy went to referendum in 2006, and this is a pivotal 
moment for the Catalan independence movement. First, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
felt that not enough progress was made towards independence in the revisions, specifically those 
coming from the Spanish national parliament. Catalonia-based political scientist Jordi 
Argelaguet expands on this, saying  
Unhappy at the extent to which the proposed text had been revised during its passage 
through the Congress of Deputies, ERC [Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya] decided to 
vote against the Statute in the referendum held on 18 June 2006… ERC thus campaigned 
alongside its arch-rival, the PP [Popular Party], to reject the proposed Stature (with the 
PSC [Catalan Socialists], ICV [Catalan Greens], and CiU [Convergència I Unió] 
campaigning in favour)… ERC pursued a win-win strategy: demonstration of its 
prioritization of its ultimate goal – independence for Catalonia – whilst keeping open the 
prospect of being a key actor in governing Catalonia and implementing enhanced self-
government within the framework of a new Statute of Autonomy.67 
The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya’s leaders maintained the prospect of being a key actor 
by knowing that the Statute would likely pass either way and that their voter base was not going 
to abandon them for sticking to their principles, leaving them with enough seats regionally to be 
a coalition kingmaker. The fact that this is considered a win-win by the party is evidence for the 
independence corollary of viability theory (which I explained above). The Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya agrees with viability theory and expects to see a decrease in voter support if they 
 
66 Ministerio del Interior, “Consulta de Resultados Electorales.”  
67 Argelaguet, “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya,” 165-166.  
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renounce their independence position, but they have to balance this with the desire to achieve 
more powers for the regional government and to stay in power to continue the pursuit of their 
goals.   
The Statute ultimately did pass the referendum but was immediately entered into a legal 
challenge in the Spanish courts, on behalf of the Popular Party.68 This irritated essentially all 
other political parties in Catalonia. It took four years for the Constitutional Court to issue a final 
verdict. In this time, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya reentered the same regional 
government coalition as before despite being briefly kicked out due to their opposition to the 
referendum. Finally, the Constitutional Court’s decision was announced in 2010 and, despite 
there only being 14 disallowed articles (and 27 more curtailed) out of 223 articles total, some of 
the most important clauses about Catalonia constituting a nation and the elevation of the Catalan 
language over Castilian Spanish were nerfed.69  
This sparked immediate protests and backlash throughout Catalonia, and most 
importantly for this study, caused the Convergència I Unió to decide that it had tried all the 
institutional and legal routes to further Catalan autonomy and Catalan nationalism; therefore it 
was now the time to pursue independence. Leader Artur Mas, who had been slowly taking a 
more separatist position since 2007, said that if his party won the regional election of 2010, he 
would hold a referendum on Catalonian independence.70 After a series of legal challenges that 
forced the referendum to be labeled as non-binding (and even then, was not recognized by the 
Spanish government), a vote was held in 2014. 80.75% voted in favor of independence but the 
 
68 Krishnadev Calmur, “The Spanish Court Decision That Sparked the Modern Catalan Independence Movement,” 
The Atlantic, October 1, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia-
referendum/541611/. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.  
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turnout was only 41.6%, which is not enough for a mandate.71 This would not be the last 
referendum attempt, but before getting to that, there are a couple points to be made.  
 First is that, in this period from the Maastricht Treaty to the 2006 Statute of Autonomy 
pushback, viability theory seems to hold up well. The Catalan separatists get a small boost from 
integration that slowly grows. This subtle growth, especially on the regional level, leads to 
opportunities for governance. The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya does not always make 
the most of these opportunities, but it does start a chain of events that directly leads to flipping a 
larger Catalan regionalist party toward favoring independence. Of course, this hurts them 
electorally because they are no longer the most prominent party in support of their main issue. 
Overall, though, this period as a series of small gains for Catalan independentism with the 
occasional setback that ends in a huge payoff that is directly linked to the smaller successes of 
the independence cause. While the unevenness of this upward trend is not projected by viability 
theory (though it is not not projected), the fact that there is an upward trend towards Catalan 
independence is strong evidence for viability theory. Next, following the most recent round of 
European integration through the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, will the now multiple Catalan separatist 
parties continue to grow?  
 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2009. The viability theory mechanism trigger in this 
round of integration was the strengthening of the position of the EU to negotiate trade deals on 
behalf of the bloc (market benefit). The following table shows Catalan independentist electoral 
results in the Spanish general elections since this round of integration. To note, the Convergència 
I Unió alliance dissolves in 2015 because the Union half becomes uncomfortable with the party’s 
separatist stance. The Union half wins no further representation and is dissolved and bankrupt by 
 
71 Duerr, Secessionism and the European Union, 108.  
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2017.72 This illustrates the power of the independence message with the voters in the 2010s. The 
Convergence half is refounded as Partit Demòcrata Català (later Partit Demòcrata Europeu 
Català, Catalan [European] Democratic Party, 2016). The renaming is specifically to further 
signify the pro-Europeanness of the party, which again is projected by and speaks to the 







de Catalunya  






2011   7.07% 29.35% (Convergència I Unió)  36.42% 
2015 15.99% 15.08% (Democràcia i Llibertat)  31.07%   
(- 5.35%) 
2016 18.18% 13.90%  32.08%  
(+ 1.01%) 




22.57% 13.68% (Junts per Catalunya) 6.37% 42.62%   
(+ 5.93%) 
Data from Ministerio del Interior.  
As one can see, Catalan independentists have grown in electoral strength every election except 
2015. The reason for the 2015 decrease is merely a factor of electoral vote share being a zero-
sum game, and in the lead up to the 2015 election, the Podemos movement had just started and 
 
72 Europa Press, “Unió inicia el proceso de liquidación del partido,” El Mundo, March 24, 2017,  
https://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2017/03/24/58d552d3ca47415a428b45c4.html.   
Piel 92 
 
capitalized on anti-corruption and left-wing populism sentiment. All major parties in Catalonia 
saw their vote share decrease and ceded votes to the Catalan branch of this Podemos movement. 
Otherwise, Catalonia in the 2010s appears to be a model viability theory case.  
Furthermore, on a regional level, Convergència I Unió governed until 2015 and pursued 
the referendum mentioned above. When the alliance collapsed in 2015, Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya (the Convergence half) was able to form an alliance with the 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya for the 2015 regional election. This election was framed as 
another attempt to get a mandate for independence from the Catalan electorate.73 This is why the 
two main pro-independence parties chose to run together (and why the Convergència I Unió 
alliance collapsed in the first place because the Union half had to get on board with 
independence, be it legal or not, or get out). The pro-independence alliance won the largest 
plurality of seats and by combining with a relatively new far-left pro-independence party that 
chose to run outside the alliance, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy, 
2012), was able to form an all-Catalan separatist regional government majority.74 However, this 
majority was only in terms of seats because the Catalan separatists were slightly short of 50% of 
the vote.75 The pro-independence alliance did not continue for national-level elections.  
In the regional government, the pro-independence forces worked together to attempt to 
hold another, this time legally binding, referendum. It was organized and held on October 1st, 
2017. 90% of voters voted for independence, but the turnout was only 43%.76 The low turnout is 
 
73 Tom Burridge, “Catalonia vote: Pro-independence parties win elections,” BBC News, September 28, 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34372548.  
74 They chose to run outside the alliance because the party believes that Catalan independence needs to occur with a 
break from the capitalist system and therefore was not willing to compromise its economic position for the sake of 
the larger independence movement because, for Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, they are inseparable. (“What is the 
CUP?,” Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, accessed on March 30, 2021, http://cup.cat/what-is-the-cup.) 
75 Burridge, “Catalonia vote.” 




in part because of unionists boycotting the vote, but also because the Spanish government and 
courts again declared the vote illegal and actually sent in police to stop people from voting. This 
erupted into violence, with police beating voters. Because of this interference and with a strong 
majority from those who did vote, the Catalan Generalitat unilaterally declared independence 
from Spain. Spain maintained its police in the region and, using emergency powers in the 
Constitution, declared direct rule over Catalonia, signaling that the Spanish government was not 
going to recognize Catalan independence. This led to pro-independence politicians being charged 
with sedition, among other crimes. Some were jailed and some fled the country into exile. The 
Spanish government then held new elections to reestablish the Generalitat in December 2017. 
The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (under a coalition 
name of Junts per Catalunya)77, and Candidatura d'Unitat Popular were the three main parties 
responsible for the 2017 referendum and declaration of independence, and once again won a 
majority of seats, yet still stayed slightly under the 50% threshold in terms of vote share.78 They 
formed a new pro-independence Generalitat, seeking to continue negotiations with Spain for 
Catalan independence.  
To conclude this section, Catalonia, in my opinion, is an example of the later stages of 
viability theory. One of the big questions of viability theory is if integration is increasing 
regionalism, why do we not see more countries forming from within the EU? Part of this answer 
is that, as with most of the regions in this case study, independence is a long way off. 
Regionalism would first need to dominate the region, and then, as Catalonia shows, the 
 
77 This is slightly confusing and an active subject of debate in Catalan courts because Junts per Catalunya is the 
name of the 2017 electoral alliance and also the name of a breakaway party formed from that alliance after the 2017 
election. Therefore, at the current moment, there are two Junts per Catalunya, but in 2017, it was just one.  
78 Seán Clarke, “Catalonia election: full results,” The Guardian, December 22, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/dec/21/catalonia-election-full-results.   
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regionalism needs to transition to separatism, and even then, a national government might use 
physical force and legal means to keep the region under its power. For the purpose of contrast, 
Flanders is likely the other region of this study closest to late-stage viability theory, yet they have 
been consistently receiving more autonomy which has tempered the greater demands for 
complete independence. Perhaps, Flanders illustrates the path of periodically ceding autonomy 
while Catalonia illustrates the path of what happens when the ceding of autonomy stops. 
Finally, looking toward the future, in the 2021 Catalan Generalitat election, the same big 
three pro-independence parties have, for the first time, surpassed 50% of the vote, though the 
turnout was lower than normal due to Covid-19.79 The Socialist prime minister of Spain has also 
taken a much more conciliatory stance with the Catalan independentists, promising a dialogue, 
though this has yet to produce any change or resolution and likely will not appease the Catalan 
politicians or general public for too long. If the trend of Catalan independence support continues 
upwards and the Spanish national politics continues to become more fractured, it is possible that 
the Catalan independentists might find themselves in a kingmaker situation, similar to the 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya’s position regionally in 2003, though kingmakers that want 
to leave the country are a tough pill for politicians to swallow because, if they do leave, you’ve 
just lost your coalition partner. Another possibility is that years of continued unsuccess end the 
Catalan independence dream, and voters give up. However, the worst possibility is that a 
staunchly unionist party (say far-right Vox, which has been gaining seats in the Spanish 
Parliament since its 2013 founding) decides to take drastic measures to end or greatly set back 
the Catalan independence movement. If this were to happen in either a violent or an authoritarian 
manner (which seems the most likely way to do it), then one would have to hope that the 
 
79 Stephen Burgen and Sam Jones, “Catalonia election: pro-independence parties increase majority,” The Guardian, 
February 14, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/14/catalonia-regional-election-covid-voting.  
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European Union would stray from its uncommitted place on the sidelines and aid those who are 




 In conclusion,1 my research examined the relationship between European integration and 
the regionalist political parties of Flanders, Corsica, Sardinia, Padania, Galicia, and Catalonia. I 
started first, by introducing a theoretical framework for understanding this relationship called the 
viability theory. Viability theory projects that European integration should benefit regionalist 
political parties, in terms of electoral support. However, it is not all European integration but 
only specific triggers that lead viability theory to project this. These triggers can come in four 
different forms: public goods benefit, market benefit, structural funds benefit, and security 
benefit.2 Therefore, after identifying major moments of European integrations that trigger 
viability theory, I looked at the electoral results in each regional case study to search for a 
noticeable positive impact.  
 I found this impact often, but not every time. By found, I mean that there was a 
correlation between integration happening and regionalist parties doing better in the subsequent 
elections. Since each individual voter makes his or her selection based on a variety of different 
criteria (and may not even be consciously thinking about European-level policy when heading to 
the national-level polls), it is impossible to have the certainty to say that European integration 
caused anything. Despite these constraints, I have found that viability theory is a compelling 
theory to explain a potential causal relationship, and I have provided an examination that most of 
the time shows the expected correlation. Additionally, viability theory was built on quantitative 
data that showed a general positive trend, my case studies match with this data, and both match 
with the theoretical expectations.  
 
1 I strongly prefer to start all my conclusions with ‘in conclusion,’ as to make everyone aware that this is a 
conclusion. I acknowledge that with the entire chapter named ‘Conclusion,’ it is a tad redundant.  
2 For greater details on why these are the four triggers, it is based on the optimal size of states literature from 
economics and explain in greater detail in the Viability Theory section of the Introduction.   
Piel 97 
 
My recommendation would be to take the idea that European integration makes 
regionalists more viable parties in elections as a general rule of thumb. Keep in mind that there 
are plenty of other contextual factors, as I have shown, such as governmental systems and 
reforms, regionalist party fragmentation, and populist co-opting that may also need to be 
considered when thinking about the past or the future of a regionalist party. Also, individual 
decisions and party-level decisions can, like a surfer, cause the regionalists to ride the wave or 
wipe out.  
 A quick breakdown of each case study illustrates this rule of thumb. In Flanders, we saw 
two periods of the expected integration-regionalist success correlation: the initial ECSC and EEC 
period and from 2009 onwards. These were separated by a long period of regionalist stagnation 
best explained by consistent decentralizing and federalizing reforms of the Belgian state. In 
Corsica, viability theory projects correctly since the Treaty of Rome in 1958. However, it was 
modified first by the electoral system and relative demographic concerns (somewhat overcome 
by violence) then by regionalist division and a shift to a negative perception of the regionalist 
violence. In Sardinia, we can only see a few small correlations with regards to national elections, 
but there is good evidence for viability theory on the regional level. In Padania, the existence and 
initial successes of Padanian regionalism correlate with integration, however, in the past decade, 
the movement’s populist nature got it tangled up with right-wing populism. In Galicia, 
fragmentation and negotiable goals on regionalism have significantly hindered the regionalists 
there. There are periods of correlation with viability theory and other periods of 
inconclusiveness. Finally, Catalonia is one of the best case studies in support of viability but is 
struggling to figure out how to go from a strong regionalism movement to an independent state.  
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What does the viability theory rule of thumb mean for the future? I will offer advice to a 
variety of actors, focusing particularly on individuals and organizations that are necessarily 
engaged with understanding regionalism in their daily work. This advice will be for those who 
work for, or on behalf of, a regionalist movement, those who work against a regionalist 
movement, and those who work on European integration, including European Union officials.  
First, for the regionalist supporters, organizers, and leaders, viability theory is a powerful 
tool in rallying voter support. Capitalize on it. Throughout my case studies, only two regionalist 
parties advocate for the regression of European integration (Vlaams Belang and Lega) and even 
then, these two parties have shown no desire to do away with all European integration. If 
regionalist parties are not yet explicitly making use of the rationale for why integration makes 
their regionalism movement (and eventual independence) more viable, then they should. They 
should also support European-level legislation that further provides one of the four benefits (like 
maybe an EU army), and they should frame Europe as an (potentially unwitting) ally in their 
quest for greater autonomy or independence.  
 Second, for those who are working against regionalists (looking at you, Mariano Rajoy),3 
my findings mean that Euroscepticism is your friend. It means approaching the EU cautiously 
when it tries to take over authority on or further create any of the four mechanisms. Additionally, 
some of the best ways to undercut regionalists are to give them some decentralization or greater 
autonomy and, if you do this, seek to go right up to the point of disagreement between the 
regionalists, so that the more autonomous factions are satisfied and thus now at odds with the 
separatists. Internal regionalist division is one of the best ways to slow regionalism. I do believe 
however that this trend is stable and persistent, and so it is quite worthwhile considering and 
 
3 Though technically Rajoy is already out of power, it is better said as looking at you, past version of Mariano 
Rajoy. This is much less catchy.  
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putting in place a non-violent satisfactory pathway for separatists, especially when you maintain 
the leverage to design and control this pathway. The Scottish referendum is a great example of 
this. However, because Brexit rebalanced the equation, the Scottish regionalists wanted their 
European integration back, and thus demands resurfaced for another referendum given the 
completely new playing field. The Scottish question was at a relatively resolved stalemate before 
that, which might be one of the best outcomes a unionist could hope for.  
 Third, and this is perhaps the most important takeaway, European Union officials need to 
realize their relationship with regionalists, specifically separatists,4 especially officials within the 
EU Parliament and the European Commission. The European Union shies away from taking any 
sort of stance on separatists, calling them national-level affairs outside its jurisdiction in an effort 
to not upset a national government. While this might be politically pragmatic as MEPs5 often 
share a political party interested in or running an entire EU member country (and within the 
European Council or the Council of Europe,6 the different leaders and ministers in power at the 
EU member country level are exactly the same people who run these EU institutions), it is wrong 
to not acknowledge the current passive effect the European Union is having. No 
acknowledgment means the EU is not contributing to a solution of the issues it is causing nor is it 
able to publicly discuss or plan for the effects that further integration could cause with regards to 
regionalism.  
However, the EU has options in deciding how to address this. It could state its 
willingness to recognize the principle of self-determination and seek to mediate separatists’ and 
unionists’ disagreements in a way that maintains stability, harmony, and belief in the EU. This 
 
4 Regionalists in search of only greater autonomy do seem to be only a national-level affair.  
5 Members of the European Parliament  
6 Among the most poorly named different institutions.  
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would likely entail the creation of a unique pathway for new countries coming from a current 
member state. Those in support of a federated states of Europe should like this idea. Conversely, 
it could definitively state that any breakaway region from a member state would have to exist 
outside the EU, thus completely invalidating the viability theory arguments. With this stance, if a 
breakaway region were to happen, it would instantly become a geostrategic liability for the EU, 
able to form partnerships with EU rivals, as well as a major inconvenience.7 However, this path 
would likely significantly dampen all forms of regionalism. The longer the EU waits to address 
this, the less effective the second option becomes (because the amount of support for regionalists 
will be higher and some will likely remain committed to their ideology even if part of the initial 
reason for it is no longer true) and the more likely the lack of the first option will lead to harm, as 
demonstrated by the headline-grabbing violence against voters in a peacefully intended illegal 
referendum in Catalonia. Also, it is important to keep in mind that 13 new countries have joined 
the EU since 2004. This means that viability theory is embryonic in half the bloc and regionalism 
movements are likely to become even more widespread. Either way, EU officials and decision-
makers, the evidence has been presented, and it is high time to get off the fence.  
Lastly, there are regions globally that seek to emulate or adapt the EU supranational 
model. The East African Federation, the African Union, and Mercosur are among the most 
famous examples of this. All I caution is that, while there are benefits to these kinds of 
organizations, it is important to be aware of the side effect of increased regionalism, or the 
drawback of increased regionalism for a country with low stability, when forging these pacts. No 
 
7 This is a more pressing concern the closer geographically the new country would be to the EU. An independent 
non-EU Bavaria would be a much greater geostrategic liability and a bigger inconvenience than an independent non-
EU Madeira for example.  
Piel 101 
 
matter where you are in the world, it is worthwhile to think about supranational integration using 
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